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Preface
The following chapters record an odyssey -  the voyage of an aspiring 
philosopher through the murky waters of academic life in the 1990s. 
Steering between the Scylla and Charybdis of conformity and idio­
syncrasy, deaf to the Siren song of an easy life outside the academia, 
daring the Cyclops of bureacracy, he is briefly enchanted by the 
Circe of external funding. Noticing, however, that the sorcerer has 
changed his shipmates into swine, he rises to challenge her, and con­
tinues his adventures, favoured by some Olympian gods of the scien­
tific community -  and censured by others.
OO OO 00
In the early 1990s, just after the completion of my doctoral thesis on 
bioethics, I spent much time and energy sketching an ethical theory 
which would be both intellectually and emotionally appealing. The 
result of my work was a book, Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied 
Ethics, which was written in 1991-93 and published in 1994.
The normative conclusions of that project as regards bioethical 
work are presented in the opening chapter of this book, where I argue 
that philosophers should strive for conceptual clarity and intuitive ac­
ceptability when they participate in the work of multidisciplinary re­
search groups. My main point is that ethical guidelines, legislation 
and public policies should not be based on views or doctrines which 
are unclear, or make appeals to unspecified feelings of approval or 
disapproval. Moral philosophers should be the ones who detect and 
draw attention to such flaws.
In the next two chapters, I apply this idea to two classic questions 
of bioethics, the beginning and the end of life, in the framework of 
new knowledge concerning latent diseases and disorders. My first 
question is how adults should react to their impending illness and 
death, and the second concerns the suffering of children as a result of 
reproductive choices. These are purely conceptual exercises based on 
certain simple intuitions, although multiple layers of meaning can be 
read into them by the champions of more complex views.
In the following four chapters I try to redefine the methodology of 
bioethics in the context of modem biotechnologies. I start with a cri­
tique of some ‘categorical’ objections to genetic engineering, and go 
on to point out some of the inadequacies of an alternative, more 
‘pragmatic’, approach. After an examination of the concept of risk, in 
chapter six, I briefly review the standard ethical responses to the use 
of gene technologies which may have adverse environmental im­
pacts. The conclusion of this survey is that the recognition of rights 
as protective shields against deliberately inflicted harm probably of­
fers the best device to ensure the ethical soundness of legislative and 
policy decisions.
In the eighth and ninth chapters, the right of individuals to know 
about their own genetic makeup when they so wish, and to remain in 
ignorance when this is what they want, is defended. The tenth chap­
ter, in its turn, can be seen as a plea for the welfare, or rights, of dairy 
animals against the economic interests of biotechnological compa­
nies.
The concluding chapter is an appendix where I recount my adven­
tures in bioethics since 1983. Written in April 2000, this piece is the 
‘bonus track’ of the otherwise retrospective collection of studies on 
bioethics in the 1990s.
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Earlier versions of most of these chapters have appeared previously 
in academic journals and edited volumes. The details of the publica­
tions have been given at the end of each chapter, where I have also 
recognised, with thanks, the help many colleagues have provided 
over the years.
On rare occasions, most notably in the sixth and seventh chapters, 
there are short passages which repeat almost word by word some 
points already made. While I apologise for these minor redundancies, 
I did not find a convenient way to avoid them.
Special thanks are due to Tuija Takala, with whom I have co­
authored chapters six to nine, and with whose permission they are re­
produced here.
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Doctors, nurses and scientists have often been accused of ‘playing 
God’ in life-and-death decisions, reproductive medicine and genetics. 
The tenor of this book is that the same accusation can be extended to 
ethicists and public decision-makers who refuse to examine the is­
sues analytically before they pass their judgements. In many cases, 
they are the jealous gods who obstruct the voyage of honest philoso­
phers and bioethicists who desperately try to find their home island 
of intellectual zeal and emotional security in the stormy sea of high 
feeling and firmly held prejudice.
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1. The Role of Philosophers in Bioethical
a|c
Research Programmes
My aim in this paper is to define the role that professional philoso­
phers can ideally play in bioethical research programmes commis­
sioned and financed by national governments and international bodies. 
The presentation is divided into three parts. In the first part, I examine 
the nature of bioethics as an activity and as an academic discipline. In 
the second part, I describe those characteristics of bioethical research 
programmes which are relevant to my inquiry. In the third part, I 
study the proper role of philosophers in these programmes, and in 
practical ethics in general.
The scope and methods of bioethics1
The concept of bioethics, or biomedical ethics, has, I believe, often 
been defined too narrowly. A 1983 edition of Webster's, for instance, 
defined bioethics as ‘a discipline dealing with the ethical implications 
of biological research and applications esp. in medicine’.2 The obvious 
deficiency of this definition is that bioethical studies have been gradu­
ally extended to moral problems which are not directly related to biol­
ogy or biomedicine. Such problems include the dilemmas of nursing 
and the questions of justice in health care provision.
Other definitions of bioethics, or biomedical ethics, are restricted 
with regard to methodology rather than to scope. In 1983 Tom Beau­
champ and James Childress, for example, defined biomedical ethics as 
The application of general ethical theories, principles, and rules to
problems of therapeutic practice, health care delivery, and medical and 
biological research’.3 The difficulties of this view include, first, that 
bioethical studies are not necessarily restricted to the mechanical ap­
plication of moral theories, and second, that laws and public opinions 
as well as moral theories should be accounted for in comprehensive 
bioethical work.
Another methodologically incomplete attempt to define bioethics is 
related to public decision-making. Medical choices can be called ‘ethi­
cal’ when they conform ‘to accepted professional standards of con­
duct’,4 and many politicians and administrators seem to think that 
bioethical studies should be confined to this type of ethicalness. For 
these individuals, bioethics has come to mean the national or interna­
tional regulation and control of medical practices and health care pro­
vision. But although Beauchamp and Childress may have emphasised 
too strongly the importance of general moral theories in biomedical 
ethics, their view is at least partly correct. Bioethical considerations 
cannot be confined merely to the examination of what is accepted or 
acceptable in terms of professional standards or democratic and bu­
reaucratic decision-making.
My own suggestion is that bioethics should be defined by reference 
to both its scope and its methods. The definition given in the Consti­
tution o f the International Association o f  Bioethics provides a good 
starting point. In Article 2 of the Constitution, bioethics is defined as 
‘the study of ethical, social, legal, and other related issues arising in 
health care and the biological sciences’. In what follows, I specify this 
general definition both with regard to subject matter and with regard 
to methodology.
The scope of bioethical studies, as I understand them, can be divided
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roughly into four fields, which are presented schematically in Figure
1.
Figure 1: The scope of bioethics
(A) First, medical decision-making which directly concerns the wel­
fare of individual patients forms, historically speaking, the hard core 
of bioethical considerations. From the Hippocratic Oath to the Decla­
ration of Geneva and onwards, the ethical codes of physicians have 
centred on issues like professional competence and the definition of 
malpractice, or medical immorality, in the light of prevailing religious 
creeds and moral views. Bedside behaviour also plays an important 
role in the more recent codes of nurses and other health care provid-
5ers.
(B) Another important field of bioethical interest is created by bio­
medical research and development. The moral issues of scientific re­
search include the use of human beings and other animals in poten­
tially harmful experiments, as well as questions related to human ge­
netic engineering and biotechnology in general.
(C) The third area on which bioethicists can focus their attention is 
formed by the provision of health care and welfare services in modem
3
societies. The central questions in this field concern the efficiency and 
respect for justice and autonomy displayed by the system which is un­
der scrutiny.
(D) Fourth, in addition to the professional, research-related and so­
cial aspects of medical and health-care ethics, there are certain global 
issues to which bioethical studies can be extended. These issues in­
clude overpopulation, world-wide justice in the distribution of health, 
and the protection of our natural environment. Bioethical studies in 
this field provide, among other things, a global background against 
which the problems of affluent Western societies can be seen in a dif­
ferent light.6
Important as I think that these points regarding the content of 
bioethical work are, bioethics as an activity and as an academic disci­
pline must be defined with reference to its aims and methods as well as 
to its scope. There are four approaches to the ethical issues of medi­
cine and health care which are relevant here. These approaches are 
presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The main approaches to bioethics
(a) The self-regulation of physicians and other health care providers 
has traditionally been regarded as the most natural way to deal with
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moral problems in medicine and related areas. The ethical rules and 
principles that professionals impose upon themselves in their volun­
tary codes usually serve, however, a dual function, and this creates 
tensions. On the one hand, the publicly advertised role of the codes is 
to make explicit the ethical guidelines which are, ideally speaking, re­
spected by the members of the profession and which ensure that the 
professionals can in their work satisfy the relevant needs and prefer­
ences of their clients without inflicting unnecessary harm or causing 
offence. On the other hand, however, the codes can also be seen as a 
front which makes it possible for the professionals to seize and main­
tain undeserved benefits and privileges, and to misuse their expertise 
and authority to obtain unproportioned shares of social and political 
power.
(b) Laws and statutes have been increasingly employed in modem 
societies to regulate medical matters. Preventive measures like quar­
antines have been enforced by law for centuries, and during the last 
few decades research ethics and ecological and population problems 
have caught the attention of the legislators. Criticisms levelled at 
medical paternalism have also brought the professional conduct of 
physicians and nurses in clinical situations under closer legal scrutiny. 
The main difficulty with this approach in the present context is that 
the relationship between medical law and bioethics is not well-defined. 
Public decision-makers could regard ethical principles as the ultimate 
basis of legal work, but usually their idea seems to be that ethical con­
siderations are subordinate to the law.
(c) Political and administrative decisions are often based, at least 
allegedly, on the results of scientific research. The moral choices con-
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ceming the provision of medicine and health care are no exception to 
this rule. Many social sciences, including epidemiology, psychology 
and nursing science, have been recruited to gain knowledge concerning 
different health care systems, and to learn about the effects of these 
systems and other socio-political factors on the morbidity, mortality 
and life quality of the population. The facts acquired by scientific 
methods do not, in and by themselves, yield normative conclusions, 
but they can certainly be suggestive if they are publicised in a social 
environment which is not, from the moral point of view, completely 
numb. Epidemiology and statistics, for instance, can shed light on the 
questions of justice and equity by examining the quantitative distribu­
tion of health, welfare and access to health care in present-day socie­
ties. Psychologists and nursing scientists, in their turn, can estimate 
the impact of health policies on individual patients by assessing 
qualitatively their physical and mental well-being.
(d) Academic philosophers have for some time now thought that 
they have something to contribute to bioethics. The supposed advan­
tages of the philosophical approach include impartiality, conceptual 
clarity, and an unhindered recourse to traditional moral theories. I 
shall return to the nature and methods of philosophical bioethics in the 
third part of the paper.
The nature of bioethical research programmes
Bioethical research programmes financed by national governments and 
international bodies can be generally characterised by examining their 
actual and potential scope, and by studying their standard approaches.
As regards the scope of publicly funded bioethical programmes, 
there are, theoretically speaking, no limits. Medical practice, scientific
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research, health care provision and ecology all embrace questions 
which can be of interest to political and administrative decision­
makers, and which can thus become the subject matter of research 
schemes commissioned by them. In practice, however, there seem to 
be areas that attract considerably more attention than others. These 
areas are usually marked off by at least one of the following features.
First, treatments, policies and medical procedures which are expen­
sive and in some sense extraordinary tend to be more noticeable than 
those which are inexpensive and commonplace. Haemodialysis has 
been the object of many ethical studies during the last four decades, 
whereas, for instance, the ethical dimensions of prescribing aspirin 
have been far less frequently discussed. Second, technological devel­
opments which seem morally suspect, but which can be expected to 
produce vast economic profits, usually seem to arouse more interest 
than less lucrative enterprises which are ethically unproblematic. In­
quiries into the morality of genetic engineering have, of late, been gen­
erously funded by the public authorities, while, say, the ethics of 
plumbing have been virtually forgotten. Third, issues which are relig­
iously controversial often attract more funding than purely secular 
concerns. Many committees and concerted action groups have been 
appointed by political decision-makers to study abortion, euthanasia 
and reproductive technologies, but few politicians have been keen to 
finance the study of the underlying, more mundane problems of, say, 
moralism, paternalism and patient autonomy.
To take a closer look at just one example, it is easy to see that AIDS 
is a natural topic for publicly-funded bioethical programmes. The 
treatments are expensive, the development of drugs, therapies and
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vaccines is economically tempting, and the mode of transmission 
makes it possible to focus on issues like sexuality, contraception, ho­
mosexuality and intravenous drug use. The difficulty here is that the 
threats and promises involved in the issue can be interpreted in many 
ways, and it is not always obvious which angle those financing the re­
search would like to choose. For responsible ethicists, the high price of 
treatments is alarming in terms of equality, because not everybody can 
afford costly drugs without public support. Those funding the work, 
however, may expect moral philosophers to justify the exclusion of so- 
called self-inflicted diseases, along with their carriers, from national 
health programmes. Again, business executives can welcome the op­
portunity to develop new drugs and vaccines, while those infected by 
the HTV can quite legitimately fear that economic duress will force 
them to become human guinea pigs for the medical corporations. And 
where liberal ethicists are troubled by the negative impact of AIDS on 
sexual enjoyment and on the rights of sexual minorities, religious 
moralists can see the spread of HIV as a warning against what they 
consider deviant and ungodly behaviour.
The self-evident aim of publicly funded bioethical programmes is to 
facilitate political and administrative decision-making. In many cases, 
the main point of these programmes is to assess the prevailing profes­
sional codes and practices, and to examine whether or not they need 
legislative control or support. But the approach assumed by commis­
sioned project groups can seldom be categorised simply as ‘public de­
cision-making’ or ‘professional self-regulation’. Rather, the methods 
chosen for most bioethical studies are, to some extent at least, scien­
tific or philosophical. This means, among other things, that the rec­
ommendations given by the research groups usually lack the norma-
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tive strength that ethical codes derive from the group solidarity of pro­
fessionals, and laws and regulations draw from the legitimate author­
ity of democratically chosen decision-makers. The conclusions 
reached within bioethical programmes can, of course, be expressed in 
the form of hypothetical norms: Tf these ends are desirable, then those 
means ought to be chosen.’ As far as the results of purely scientific 
research are concerned, this is, in fact, the only type of normativity 
that can be reasonably allowed. But philosophical work in bioethics is 
not necessarily restricted to the creation of conditional norms. Other 
viable options can, I think, be found by studying the methods moral 
philosophers can employ in this field.
The role of philosophers7
There are four basic ways in which philosophers can examine the 
moral problems of medical practice, biomedical research, health care 
provision and ecology. These ways are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The methods of philosophical bioethics
(i) Metaethics, or ‘the study of the meanings of ethical terms, the 
nature of ethical judgements, and the types of ethical arguments’,8 is a
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prerequisite for all systematic ethical studies, including comprehensive 
studies in bioethics. Reliable moral judgements cannot be based on 
considerations which lack a firm conceptual foundation. Some schol­
ars of the analytical school have thought that linguistic clarification is 
the only legitimate task for philosophers in practical matters. But the 
popularity of this view has been steadily on the decline since the 
1950s.
(ii) Theoretical studies in normative ethics, in their turn, provide an­
swers to regulative questions concerning the value of states of mind 
and states of affairs, the rightness of human actions, and the desirabil­
ity and worth of various character traits. Without the support of nor­
mative theories and principles, bioethicists would seldom be able to 
offer solutions to the moral dilemmas they unearth and analyse. But 
there are two features which make the straightforward application of 
any traditional moral doctrine to real-life issues problematical. First, 
there are situations in which no standard ethical theory can provide an 
intuitively acceptable and universally valid solution. This is charac­
teristically the case when the basic needs, or basic interests, of indi­
viduals or groups are in conflict. Second, even the solutions proposed 
to less difficult questions by traditional ethical views vary considera­
bly, compelling moral agents to make a choice between the theories. 
But on what grounds should this choice be made? Is it possible to find 
fundamental axioms on which all valid moral principles are based? 
Answers to these questions have divided philosophers for centuries.
(iii) One feasible line of argument is to say that there are, as a mat­
ter of fact, no ultimate principles on which moral theories could be 
founded, and subsequently no valid reasons to prefer one normative 
theory to another. Early proponents of this view thought that philoso-
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phers should forgo their customary ethical speculations concerning the 
absolute rightness and wrongness of actions, and concentrate instead 
on the relative rightness and wrongness of actions according to the 
customs, laws and shared moral feelings that prevail or have prevailed 
in contemporary or historical societies. This approach, which can be 
labelled psychological ethics or moral sociology, has many advantages 
in the study of social and cultural phenomena, as it prevents anthro­
pologists from judging, and thereby distorting, the views of those they 
observe. But although ethical relativism may be a necessary meth­
odological assumption for descriptive social scientists, it is not a view 
which could be fully condoned by the majority of today’s moral phi­
losophers. Despite the genuine need for toleration towards unfamiliar 
opinions and ways of life, there are limits beyond which Western ethi- 
cists do not usually want to extend their moral acceptance.9
(iv) The approach which enables philosophers to present normative 
solutions to practical issues without evoking all the difficulties of tra­
ditional ethical theories has come to be called applied ethics. This 
method should be kept carefully apart from the mechanical application 
of moral doctrines to the real-life problems introduced by concerned 
citizens and public decision-makers. The latter view, the so-called en­
gineering model of applied ethics, is open to many thorny questions 
regarding the identification of moral problems, the scope of ethical in­
quiries and the impartiality of professional moral philosophers.10 Ap­
plied ethics proper, on the other hand, can be employed quite success­
fully to examine controversial practices, policies and situations.
The work of applied ethicists proper can be divided into two closely 
related tasks, which both involve the assessment of moral responses as
11
well as the analysis of conceptual coherence and logical consistency. I 
have coined11 the phrases ‘cognitive deprogramming’ and ‘rational re­






Mapping A survey of some of 
the prevailing theo­
ries and views re­
garding the issue to 
be settled.
A survey of some of 
the potential solu­
tions suggested to 




The assessment of 
these theories and 
views from the con­
ceptual and logical 
point of view.
The assessment of 
these potential solu­
tions from the con­




The evaluation of 
these theories and 
views in the light of 
idealised or imagi­
nary examples.
The evaluation of 
these potential solu­
tions in the light of 
hypothetical exam­
ples.
Table 1: The methods of applied philosophical ethics
All human action takes place in an empirical moral reality, where 
judgements and assessments are constantly made by public authori­
ties, professionals and ordinary citizens. Consequently, the philoso­
pher’s first task in studying real-life moral dilemmas is to uncover the 
principles and codes which have been applied previously to the issue 
in hand. The methods employed in this mapping of the prevailing theo­
ries and views are similar to those used in normative ethics and moral 
sociology.
When the mapping of the existent rules and beliefs has been com-
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pleted, the work can proceed to the stages of conceptual and emotional 
cognitive deprogramming. By cognitive deprogramming I mean the 
critical assessment of prevailing ethical views which have their roots 
in laws and statutes, common-sense morality, personal convictions, 
religious doctrines, professional codes, philosophical theories and in 
fragments of scientific thinking. The evaluation may or may not result 
in changes in these views, as philosophers can sometimes but not al­
ways make people unlearn specious models of moral reasoning. The 
methods by which applied ethicists can try to make other people aban­
don their previous views are, first, conceptual analysis, and, second, 
the use of idealised or imaginary test cases.
Conceptual cognitive deprogramming consists of the analysis and 
critical assessment of the terms and arguments which have been used 
in the formulation of everyday moral rules and principles. If the termi­
nology in use is ambiguous, or if the inferences made are invalid, the 
rules and principles in question must be either reformulated or re­
jected. Emotional cognitive deprogramming, in its turn, centres on the 
use of idealised or imaginary examples. These examples are normally 
designed to portray how, under particular hypothetical circumstances, 
apparently reasonable moral rules and principles lead to actions which 
have intuitively unacceptable consequences. Imaginary cases cannot 
normally be employed to establish moral views, or to refute them ab­
solutely, but if they are well chosen they can in many cases provide 
good grounds for abandoning certain prima facie approvable ethical 
rules and principles.
Successful cognitive deprogramming may create a momentary moral 
vacuum, which must then be refilled with new ideals and new rules of
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conduct. If called upon at this point, applied philosophers can continue 
their work by trying rationally to reconstruct acceptable ethical prin­
ciples and theories to replace the previous ones. Rationality in this 
context means that the norms and rules arrived at must be intrinsically 
consistent, mutually compatible and on the whole reasonably accept­
able. But the criteria of consistency and acceptability cannot always 
be set from outside, or from above. While conceptual consistency and 
logical soundness may yield to objective criteria, intuitive acceptabil­
ity is often a function of the deep values which prevail in the commu­
nity under scrutiny. The conclusions of the applied ethicist are in these 
cases ad hominem, or of the form: ‘Since your own basic norms, val­
ues and beliefs are this-and-this, and you presumably wish to be con­
sistent, you ought to consider it your duty to do, or your right to have, 
that-and-that. ’
Rational reconstruction proceeds in three stages, which are closely 
analogous to the steps taken in cognitive deprogramming. The starting 
point is a survey of at least some of the axiological and normative 
principles which have been applied to relevantly similar cases in the 
past. When this survey has been completed, the potential solutions 
must, once again, undergo the tests of consistency and intuitive ac­
ceptability.
Summary and conclusions
What, then, is the proper role of philosophers in bioethical research 
programmes? My answer to this question is based on the foregoing 
remarks on the nature of bioethics, practical philosophy and applied 
ethical work. Philosophers are not essentially medical professionals, 
public decision-makers or social scientists, nor can bioethical prob-
1 4
lems be solved exclusively by using the methods of metaethics, nor­
mative ethics or moral sociology. The proper role of philosophers is, 
therefore, the role of the applied ethicist.
The task of the applied ethicist in bioethical programmes, in its turn, 
is easy to describe. After the problem has been identified, there are 
three questions that should be asked and answered time and again until 
the replies to all three are satisfactory. These questions are:
(1) What is the best hitherto unrefuted solution to the problem?
(2) Is this solution logically and conceptually consistent?
(3) Is it emotionally and intuitively acceptable?
As long as the answers to questions (2) or (3) are in the negative, the 
work must go on. But when both questions can be answered affirma­
tively, the task of the applied philosopher is completed, and the speci­
fied solution is valid unless proven otherwise.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented in the ‘Philosophy and 
AIDS Workshop’, Paris, France, 12-15 January 1995, arranged by the 
Commission of the European Communities Biomedical and Health Re­
search Programme Project AIDS: Ethics, Justice and European Policy. My 
thanks are due to the Coordinator of the Project, Professor John Harris, and 
to the participants of the workshop, for their useful comments. My thanks 
are also due to Mark Shackleton, Senior Lecturer in English, University of 
Helsinki, for checking the language of the paper.
This article was originally published, in a slightly different form, in C.A.
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and Policy 1, 1996, 23-30; and it was reprinted, with minor modifications, 
in The American Philosophical Association Newsletters 98 (1), 1998, 111- 
115.
1 The contents of this section have been assembled by combining the ideas 
expressed in two previous articles, namely M. Häyry and S. Karjalainen, 
‘Academic bioethics in Finland’, European Philosophy o f Medicine and 
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Finnish), in Fakta 2001 Täydennysosa 1994 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1994), 28- 
31.
2 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: 
Merriam-Webster Inc., 1983), s.v. bioethics.
3 T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics, 
second edition (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), ix.
4 Webster's 1983, s.v. ethical.
5 Some of the most important ethical codes of medical professionals are 
reprinted in Beauchamp and Childress 1983.
6 The term ‘bioethics’ was probably first used by Van Rensselaer Potter to 
refer to the moral study of environmental and population problems in his 
book Bioethics, Bridge to the Future (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1969).
7 Many ideas put forward in this section have been introduced in M. Häyry, 
Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 147-158.
8 Webster's 1983, s.v. metaethics.
9 The dispute between ethical relativism and ethical absolutism is a 
particularly Western phenomenon. Not many non-Westem cultures can 
claim a similar history of two thousand years of monotheistic 
evangelization, followed by a series of attempts to reject this tradition.
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10 See, e.g., A.L. Caplan, ‘Can applied ethics be effective in health care and 
should it strive to be?’, Ethics 93 (1983): 311-319; M. Häyry, Critical 
Studies in Philosophical Medical Ethics (Helsinki: Department of 
Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 1990), 6-10.
11 Häyry 1990, 11.
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2. How to Make Sense of One’s 
Impending Illness and Death?*
We are all going to die one day. Our hearts will stop beating, our 
brains will quit functioning, and we shall cease to exist. Some of us 
will die of old age, that is, of the general inability of the human body 
to stay alive, even in ideal conditions, for much over a hundred years. 
Others will die in the midst of life, affected by an unexpected disease 
or struck by a fatal accident. And still others know in advance that 
their lives will be shortened by an illness which is, at the present 
time, latent or at its earlier stages. Whatever the differences between 
these cases, and the prospects they offer, we are all mortal, and there­
fore equally confronted by the question: ‘How do we make sense of 
our impending illness, infirmity, and death?’
Two levels of moral inquiry
Moral philosophers can try to make sense of the universal and inevi­
table human morbidity and mortality in two ways -  descriptively and 
normatively.
At the descriptive level, the initial questions that interest the moral 
philosopher are: ‘How do we, as a matter of empirical fact, react to 
our own impending illness and death?’ ‘What do we think?’ ‘How do 
we feel?’ ‘What do we do?’ The obvious answer to these questions is 
that different individuals react in different ways. Some accept the 
knowledge of their infirmity and death with dignified resignation, 
even with gratitude. Others are uncomplaining but hope, often se­
cretly, that they could have been spared the information. Still others
react violently, accuse themselves and others of their condition, and 
seek for revenge. In the light of this variation, the real question turns 
out to be how to explain the similarities and dissimilarities in the pre­
vailing attitudes and ongoing behaviour. Can the pattern of one’s re­
action be divined by studying the circumstances in which one learns 
about one’s fate? Or should the reasons for the individual’s response 
rather be pursued by examining religious beliefs and other less con­
crete factors? I shall make an attempt to answer these questions in the 
first part of this paper.
At the normative level, the basic question is: ‘How should we, 
morally speaking, react to our own impending illness and death?’ 
There are two issues which ought to be dealt with here. First, how 
should we respond to the knowledge that we are going to die sooner 
than we had thought? It has been argued that it is in our own best in­
terest to know about our condition, because the knowledge enables us 
to make autonomous and well-informed decisions concerning our 
lives. But is this argument valid, and if it is, under what circum­
stances? Second, how should we respond to the fact that we are going 
to die sooner than we had thought? Are some of our possible reac­
tions more justifiable than others, and if they are, on what grounds? 
These questions will be answered, at least partly, in the second part 
of the paper.
A note on methodology
Before tackling the more substantive issues, I should add a note on 
the methodology that I have used. Every observation, remark and 
comment that I make is based solely on introspection and imagina­
tion. I have employed no psychological or sociological theories, nor 
have I consulted any systematically collected body of empirical evi-
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dence regarding mental or social phenomena. In a word, my approach 
in this paper is purely speculative.
How do  people react to their impending illness and death?
The first substantive question concerns the significance of the cir­
cumstances in which people learn about their impending illness or 
death. There are four major types of case which ought to be consid­
ered.
First, since all human beings are mortal, anyone can at any time be­
come acutely aware of one’s eventual fate. Most religions and some 
philosophical creeds actually feed on the insecurity that people feel in 
the face of suffering and death, although there are also doctrines 
which teach that the end of life should not be feared in any way. It is 
probably safe to say, however, that the majority of people in the af­
fluent West try to ignore their own mortality, and suppress all infor­
mation that could contribute to the awareness of the fact. This sup­
pression tends to make it difficult for individuals to cope with grave 
illness when they are confronted by it, and it also tends to make it 
difficult for others, for individuals who have not been afflicted by se­
rious disease, to provide help and to offer consolation.
Second, even those who are lucky enough to avoid what can be 
considered premature illness and death will eventually have to be­
come aware of their mortality when their ageing bodies begin to de­
generate and their mental activity starts to slow down and fail. Many 
people who have lived to an old age have met approaching infirmity 
and imminent death with relative calmness, recognizing the inevita­
bility of the process. But this attitude has by no means been univer­
sally shared. Old people have also died reluctantly, filled with fear, 
anxiety and rancour in the face of their finiteness.
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Third, human beings of any age are forced to become aware of their 
own vulnerability if they are suddenly struck by grave illness or in­
jury. The initial reaction in these cases is often shock, followed by 
milder astonishment and confusion. More reflective attitudes range 
from resentment and vengefulness to resignation and concern for 
others.
Fourth, due to the development of diagnostic techniques many peo­
ple can nowadays learn about a disease they have while the disease is 
still asymptomatic or at an early stage. Individuals who are afflicted 
by multiple sclerosis, or are infected by the human immunodefi­
ciency virus, or are endowed with certain so-called genetic disorders, 
may be informed of their condition years before they can be expected 
to fall ill -  if, indeed, they can be expected to fall ill at all. People’s 
reactions to the knowledge regarding a latent ailment vary, of course, 
considerably according to the gravity, present phase and predicted 
progression of the disease.
The resentment and anger that individuals may feel towards their 
undesired condition can be projected in various directions, depending 
on the nature of the disease in question. Those with hereditary prob­
lems can, if they so choose, attach the guilt to their parents, while 
persons with communicable diseases can blame anyone they see as 
the source of their contagion. If it is conceivable that the ailment 
could have been avoided by choosing a different life-style, individu­
als sometimes accuse themselves, and when the origin of the disease 
is unknown, people often rebuke their bad luck or ill fortune.
The circumstances in which individuals learn about their illness or 
imminent death seem to have a tangible, but not a decisive, role in 
the formation of their reactions. People dying of old age, for instance, 
can be expected to yield to their fate more peacefully than individuals
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who suddenly fall ill in their prime, but since there are countless ex­
ceptions to this rule, and to all similar rules, it is impossible to predict 
with certainty people’s responses to the knowledge merely by refer­
ring to their age and general health status.
The similarities and dissimilarities in the reactions towards death 
and disease can be further elucidated by drawing on two important 
sources of a person’s self-image. These sources are the religious con­
victions people hold and the opinions they have concerning the full­
ness o f their lives so far. In the Western world, where the dominant 
religious beliefs are Judaeo-Christian, the two factors can be em­
ployed to distinguish between three main types of response to one’s 
fate.1
One of the core ideas of Judaism and Christianity is that the uni­
verse is created and controlled by a superhuman, benevolent and per­
sonal force, God. The existence and continuing presence o f this pow­
erful and watchful supreme being guarantees that every human life 
has, from the viewpoint of eternity, its measure and meaning, and, 
furthermore, that the lives of individuals will continue after the death 
of their bodies. In the present context, these points imply that faithful 
Christians and Jews should not resent too passionately the fact that 
they are subject to illness, injury and premature death. The gratitude 
felt for the gift of life should within these religious frameworks out­
weigh the anxiety possibly caused by the general uncertainty of the 
human lot.
By saying that religious believers ‘should’ accept their fate with 
dignity I do not mean that they are in any absolute sense morally or 
legally bound to obey the will of God as they see it. What I mean is 
that persons who firmly insist that they have been treated unfairly by 
the creator of the universe cannot, conceptually speaking, be re-
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garded as faithful Jews or Christians. Their responses have to be ex­
amined in the same category as the reactions of self-confessed athe­
ists and agnostics.
Nonreligious individuals who think that they have already lived a 
full and significant life can assume a relatively relaxed view towards 
their own impending illness and death. As depicted in many biogra­
phies and several works of literary fiction, people who do not seek 
consolation from religious beliefs can sometimes find comfort in the 
notion that a good and timely death completes a good life. In fact, 
atheists and agnostics who genuinely believe that they have lived a 
full life should accept their demise as quietly as faithful Christians 
and Jews.
The only ones who are, according to my analysis, conceptually en­
titled to full-fledged resentment in the face of illness and death are 
the nonbelievers who do not think that their lives have been com­
pletely fulfilled yet. This attitude is quite understandable, when, for 
instance, young persons are struck by a fatal disease before they have 
had the opportunity to experience all the phases that human beings 
are, according to popular feeling, supposed to experience during their 
lifetimes. The reaction also seems appropriate in situations where 
other people’s lives and fortunes depend on the contribution of the 
ones at immediate risk of death. But the limits of this category can be 
extended far beyond these morally uncontroversial cases, as indi­
viduals can always argue that they have not, up to the present time, 
managed to achieve all the things they have resolved to achieve in 
their lives. As long as the episodes which are allegedly missing from 
a person’s life are reasonably attainable by human effort, such com­
plaints are conceptually justifiable.
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To recapitulate, certain basic religious beliefs, and the views people 
have concerning the fullness of their lives, can be employed to define 
three types of response to grave illness and premature death. First, 
faithful Jews and Christians should see their lives as part of a divine 
plan, and they should, consequently, accept their destinies with pas­
sive obedience. Second, nonreligious persons who believe that their 
lives have been full and complete, ought to regard a good death as the 
suitable conclusion to a good life. Third, nonbelievers who think that 
their lives have not yet been fulfilled, are the only ones who are con­
ceptually entitled to resentment and anger in the face of sudden ill­
ness and imminent death.
How sh o u ld  people react to illness and death?
Granted that my descriptions and classifications are, to some extent 
at least, plausible, people’s beliefs and opinions, as well as their age 
and health status, can be employed to explain some of the prevailing 
attitudes towards illness and death. But, moving on to the domains of 
prudence and morality, how should individuals react to the knowl­
edge concerning their mortality? What should a person think when 
his family doctor tells him that his body is infected with a wide­
spread, malignant tumour? How should he feel, when she, the doctor, 
informs him that his HTV test result was positive? And what should 
he do if she reveals that he is the carrier of a fatal genetic disorder?
It is possible, and quite natural, that the person’s first reaction is 
evasive and negative. Many people believe that they have a right not 
to know about their medical condition, especially if the knowledge is 
unpleasant and emotionally disturbing.2 Others, however, have de­
fended the view that autonomous individuals have a duty to know 
about their health status.3 There are, I think, some sound prudential
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and moral grounds to subscribe to the latter view in our present con­
text.
As regards prudence, it is obvious that the person’s own long-term 
self-interest can be promoted by the knowledge. Those who know 
about their condition can make informed, rational choices concerning 
medical treatment, life-style, and other matters which are pertinent to 
their continued survival and life quality. Another clear, if less con­
crete, advantage is that informed individuals can make more realistic 
life plans than persons who have chosen to remain in ignorance. If 
one is expected to live less than a year, it is of no use to plan seri­
ously a journey which would take place in two years’ time. On the 
other hand, if there are things that one has always wanted to do, the 
information regarding one’s illness can be seen as a signal to pursue 
the unfulfilled desires while there is still time.
In the field of morality and moral considerations, as in the realm of 
prudence, the benefits of knowing about one’s health status are mani­
fest. It is widely deemed wrong to inflict harm on other human be­
ings, and knowledge reduces the likelihood that we commit this par­
ticular wrong. In the case of communicable diseases, for instance, 
those who are aware of their infection are often better motivated, and 
always cognitively better equipped, to avoid passing on the disease to 
others than those who do not know about their condition. Further­
more, since people’s destinies and life plans are inexorably inter­
twined, decisions made by autonomous individuals, even if designed 
to influence only themselves, frequently have beneficial or harmful 
repercussions on other people as well.
Although we ‘should’, both prudentially and morally speaking, un­
derstand that it is good to know about our impending illness and 
death, the strength of the obligation varies along with the contents of
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the disclosure. The closer we are to fatal illness and death, the more 
important it is to us to make well-informed, autonomous decisions 
concerning our own lives and the lives of those who depend on us. If 
a person has less than six months to live, her prudential duty to know 
it, and to arrange her life accordingly, is rather strict. The situation is 
different, however, when the threat of illness is more remote. Since 
individuals with genetic disorders sometimes live for years, even 
decades, without any detectable symptoms, it would be difficult to 
argue on self-regarding grounds that they have an obligation to ac­
quire the knowledge. If they have a duty to know, this is based on the 
possibility that they might otherwise pass on the disease to their off­
spring.
Let me emphasize, at this point, that the obligations that I have 
evoked here belong to the realms of prudence and individual moral­
ity, and that they are subject to social facts and norms regarding 
prevalent attitudes, the provision of health care, and the legitimacy of 
the political system as a whole. The duty to know about one’s condi­
tion is, therefore, at most a prima facie moral obligation, which can 
be outweighed by more serious moral considerations, and which can­
not, without further justification, be enforced by law.
Despite the fact that we cannot be legitimately compelled to know 
about our health status, every day thousands of individuals are in­
formed, voluntarily or involuntarily, of their impending illness and 
death. Putting the issues involving the duty to know on one side, the 
question is, how should people react to the fact that they are expected 
to fall seriously ill, or to die prematurely? What should they do with 
their lives, and how should they behave towards other people?
If my remarks on the value of informed decision-making are valid, 
then people who suddenly learn about their untoward fate should try
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to rearrange, as soon as they have recovered from the shock, their 
preferences and life plans according to the newly discovered facts. 
This would in many cases improve both their life expectancy and life 
quality, and it would therefore be advisable from their own, pruden­
tial, standpoint. Seen from the moral point of view, again, individuals 
who are confronted by premature death should also do their best to 
guarantee the future wellbeing of those who depend on them, pri­
marily their young children, unwaged spouses, and elderly parents. In 
more advanced societies, where the material welfare of individuals is 
publicly secured, this responsibility can in most cases be confined to 
the provision of emotional support.4
Persons who discover that they are fatally ill sometimes blame 
themselves or others for their condition. If they have fully grasped 
the nature of their own predicament, and if their notion of the pre­
vailing circumstances is correct, their accusations can in many cases 
be justified. For example, I can quite legitimately blame myself or 
my sex partners for contracting a sexually transmitted disease, if the 
possibilities of other modes of contagion have been reliably ruled 
out. But there is seldom any point in my doing this. I can, of course, 
claim that I have been victimized by the earlier carriers of the dis­
ease, but since their fate has in the majority of cases been similar to 
mine, this would not, apart from a few genuinely criminal cases, be 
either fair or reasonable. I can also, if I so choose, blame myself for 
making less than considered choices, but it is difficult to see who 
could benefit from these self-accusations.
Politicians and administrators who are in charge of public decision­
making can sometimes be held partly responsible for the prevalence 
of fatal diseases and lethal accidents.5 The evil effects of illness, in­
jury and premature death can, furthermore, be aggravated by the
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same individuals if  they uphold unjust social and economic struc­
tures. When this is the case, the victims have a right, perhaps even a 
duty, to reproach those responsible and try to replace them. But this 
right, or duty, is not confined to those who have suffered from the ill- 
advised decisions. Every decent person has an obligation to criticize 
policies which tend to inflict unnecessary suffering on innocent indi­
viduals.
Even those who do not blame themselves or others for their mis­
fortune often resent the state they are in due to illness or injury. If 
they are not fully committed to the idea of benevolent divine guid­
ance, and if their lives have been less than complete, they are, pro­
vided that my observations have been correct so far, conceptually 
entitled to their resentment. Prudence and morality dictate, however, 
certain limits to the manifestations of the emotion. The most impor­
tant of these limits concerns the possibility of suicide. Autonomous 
individuals are prudentially free to end their own lives, but only if 
they have decided to do so without coercion or pressure in the light 
of truthful and adequate information. In addition, there are two moral 
requirements which ought to be met. First, even suicides have to con­
sider the impact of their decision on their dependants. It is not mor­
ally right to end one’s life if  one’s family and friends have to suffer 
the consequences of the deed. Second, rational persons who intend to 
take their lives ought to make sure that they are not setting an exam­
ple to those who are not equally capable of assessing the motives and 
results of their actions. To prompt another individual to commit sui­
cide on insufficient grounds is a moral wrong that should be avoided.
Apart from all these negative and critical duties, people who suffer 
from fatal ailments may have a more positive obligation to support 
others with similar problems. This obligation could be based on the
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fact that people who have to live with a particular type of illness or 
injury are sometimes better equipped to deal with the specific ques­
tions that arise from it than others. It should be kept in mind, how­
ever, that even if this special duty to help others can be justified, it 
cannot be legitimately enforced by law or public opinion.
Facing the facts
In sum, how should we react to our impending illness and death? 
What should we do when we suddenly learn that our prospects are 
bleak and our days are numbered? My remarks seem to suggest the 
following conclusions.
When we are confronted by illness, injury and premature death, we 
should begin, after the initial shock, by assessing the facts of the 
situation, including our prognosis and our attitudes towards life, 
death, and the possibility of an afterlife. We should then try to rear­
range our remaining lives, and the lives of those who depend on us, 
in view of the facts that we have learned. It would be futile to resent 
the knowledge that our lives will come to an end sooner than we had 
thought, but it is not necessarily futile to resent the fact that this is 
going to happen. Our resentment should be directed against the per­
sons and structures responsible for the prevalence of preventable dis­
eases and accidents, most notably negligent public authorities, not 
against ourselves or those near us. If our condition is hopeless and we 
are suffering acutely, rational suicide is an option, but only if the 
choice is well-informed and autonomous, and only if  other individu­
als are not unduly harmed by the decision.
These conclusions, which I have put in the form of duties and lib­
erties, can also be expressed in terms of desirable character traits, or 
virtues. We are all mortal, and we are all subject to illness and injury.
2 9
But if my speculations have any truth in them, we can make sense of 
our existence and strive successfully for a good life, even in the face 
of premature death, if only we have three traditionally valued skills 
and virtues, namely the serenity to accept the things we cannot 
change, the courage to change the things we can, and the wisdom to 
know the difference.6
Notes
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and Policy 1, 1996, 38-42.
1 Since I am not sufficiently acquainted with other cultures, I confine my 
remarks to Western communities which adhere to Christianity or Judaism.
2 For a defence of this view in cases where the choice concerns only the per­
sons themselves see, for instance, H. Häyry, The Limits o f Medical Pater­
nalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 153-155.
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3 For a defence of this view in situations where the knowledge can be used 
to benefit others see J. Harris, The Value o f Life: An introduction to medical 
ethics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 208.
4 By ‘the more advanced societies’ I mean Scandinavian-type welfare states.
5 An example of what I have in mind is that by preventing the marketing and 
use of condoms in Catholic countries and in the Third World the Pope on 
account of his authority makes himself partly responsible for the spread of 
AIDS.
6 This list, in the form of a prayer, has been attributed to the American 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.
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3. Is It Undesirable that Children Are Born
Infected with HIV?*
There are few issues in the context of HIV and AIDS which rouse 
more emotions than the fact that children can be infected with the vi­
rus even before they are bom. Many people feel that it is undesirable, 
indeed intolerable, that grave suffering is inflicted upon innocent new­
borns and their families, and believe, therefore, that children should 
not be bom with the infection if this can be helped. But what, exactly, 
does this mean? How can the suffering caused by HTV and AIDS be 
controlled, and what is required of others if this aim is to be achieved? 
In what follows I am going to argue that radical changes are needed in 
popular and official attitudes before the unnecessary suffering of 
newly bom children and their families can be effectively prevented.
The normative starting point of this paper is simply that avoidable 
suffering should not be inflicted, by acts or omissions, on actual or 
prospective individuals, unless even greater suffering can thereby be 
alleviated or prevented. This is a position I share with many contem­
porary philosophers of the consequentialist tradition.1 I must empha­
sise, however, that I do not automatically condone the infliction of 
harm or suffering in cases where greater harm can, as a consequence, 
be prevented, as some utilitarians do. There are other considerations to 
be taken into account in conflict situations. But I do believe that harm­
ful actions which cannot even be expected to check comparable harm 
elsewhere are never justifiable.2
There are two ways to secure that children are not bom with HIV
infection, and thus harmed by other people. The first is to guarantee 
that foetuses and infants are not congenitally infected with the virus. 
The second is to make sure that children -  or foetuses -  who do carry 
the virus are not allowed to be bom. Since the first alternative saves 
lives as well as spares people from needless suffering, it should clearly 
be preferred. But many economic and emotional factors prevent gov­
ernments from enforcing this option.
Preventing HIV infections before conception
The most natural method to decrease the incidence of HIV among 
newly bom children is to ensure that individuals who reproduce do not 
have the virus. This, in its turn, could probably be best accomplished 
by providing everybody with information and education, and special 
groups with free condoms, syringes, needles and other devices which 
lower the risk of contagion. But three problems arise here. First, many 
people who are offended by explicit sex education try to keep others, 
especially children, from knowing about contraceptives and safer sex 
practices. Second, most governments have difficulties providing intra­
venous drug users with free and clean syringes and needles, as the un­
authorised use of these drugs is illegal. Third, education, hospital hy­
giene and the testing of blood and blood products is expensive, and 
cannot therefore be procured unless sufficient resources are allocated 
to these sectors, which in many countries is not the case.
The other way to prevent individuals from having HIV-infected 
children is to restrict their right to reproduce by either moral or legal 
sanctions. This alternative has been opposed for many different rea­
sons, none of which is, I think, good. Some people seem to think that it 
would be wrong to discourage the deliberate production of even suf-
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fering offspring, because all human reproduction is good and should 
not therefore be intentionally interfered with. Whatever the intrinsic 
merits of this view, my sympathies towards it are seriously limited by 
the fact that it advocates openly the promotion of avoidable suffering, 
which goes against my normative premises in this paper. Others have 
argued, more feasibly, that legal sanctions on childbearing are wrong, 
because widely accepted international agreements stipulate that all 
human beings are entitled to form a permanent relationship and to 
found a family. Insofar as these regulations are meant to eradicate dis­
crimination, and to give individuals an equal right to have healthy 
children regardless of their nationality, skin colour, health status or 
sexual preferences, the underlying morality is sound. It is difficult for 
me to see, however, why these statutes would grant individuals the 
right to bring about suffering children. Equality would certainly not be 
threatened by a universal ban on the practice, as everybody would 
have the same obligation to avoid bringing about unnecessary pain.
The reluctance to interfere with people’s family lives at all is at least 
partly based on the extremeness of the measures that would have to be 
taken to check the birth of suffering infants. But suppose that this 
could be changed, for instance, by giving everybody a pill that would 
make them provisionally infertile. Instead of having to deal with indi­
viduals who are, as a rule, capable of reproducing unless this capacity 
is limited, public authorities would face a population that can have 
children only with the help of the medical profession. Under these cir­
cumstances, the regulation would surely be more widely accepted, as 
evidenced by the prevailing disinclination to select couples with he­
reditary genetic problems for programmes of assisted reproduction.
Many people think, no doubt, that even in my hypothetical situation
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individuals should be freely allowed to conceive and give birth to suf­
fering infants, or at least to gamble with the possibility. My moral dis­
agreement with them concerns the degree to which human beings 
should try to control their lives and the lives of those they are respon­
sible for. I agree that legal sanctions would be an unnecessarily rough 
method of preventing the existence of suffering newborns in a world 
where reproduction is not normally restricted. But since I also believe 
that nobody should knowingly bring about unnecessary suffering, it 
would, I think, be wrong of medical authorities to actually assist peo­
ple in conceiving and giving birth to HIV-infected children. And I am 
inclined to think that it would be, at least prima facie, right to threaten 
the potential parents with moral disapproval and social contempt even 
in our present world.
Preventing the birth and taking the lives of HIV-infected 
children
If it is impossible or difficult to prevent the creation of foetuses and 
infants who would be infected with HIV, the question of ending their 
lives before birth or shortly afterwards arises. The legally easier solu­
tion in many European countries is abortion, which at the official level 
can be either morally encouraged or legally required. Theoretically 
speaking, the more obnoxious choice is to let the child be bom and 
then take its life. It is not obvious, however, which option conscien­
tious parents would find convenient in practice. I shall return to this 
question after a few remarks on the abortion issue.
Those who hold liberal views on social ethics and policy can easily 
condone certain types of moral encouragement in an HTV-related 
abortion situation while rejecting other kinds of persuasion along with
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the idea of legally forcing women to terminate their pregnancies. The 
acceptable variety of pro-abortion counselling would consist of infor­
mation and support, whereas the application of any kind of mental 
pressure upon the decision-makers would have to be condemned. On 
the other hand, of course, people who oppose abortions on personal, 
religious or moral grounds would presumably find all encouragement 
to terminate a pregnancy inadvisable and disturbing.
But when it comes to infants who have already been bom, the atti­
tudes of those who reject abortion can become slightly paradoxical. If 
a child bom with HTV is too weak to survive without extraordinary 
care and attention, some parents who have already refused termination 
can interpret this as a sign saying that the child ought to be let out of 
its misery. The idea underlying this kind of thinking seems to be that 
only positive actions like abortion can be morally condemned. Since a 
decision to let the infant die does not involve such actions, it cannot be 
wrong, either. The reasoning here is, I should have thought, blatantly 
skewed, but people do not always stop to think all that carefully what 
they are doing in emotionally loaded situations. It should be noted here 
that many philosophers do, in fact, uphold the view that positive ac­
tions are intrinsically different from omissions in the context of medi­
cal choices involving life and death.
Nobody would, I believe, seriously consider the possibility of delib­
erately killing children bom with HTV, not at least in the more affluent 
European countries. Incorrigible liberals like myself can defend active 
euthanasia in cases where a gravely suffering newborn does not have 
the capacity to become a person with self-awareness, beliefs and emo­
tions, but infants bom with HTV can usually be expected to live a 
quite meaningful, if often short and painful, life.
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To recapitulate, if it is intolerable that children are bom with HTV, 
there are four principal methods to tackle the issue. First, public 
health authorities can try to ensure that people who conceive children 
do not carry the virus. This, I think, would be the best policy overall, 
but people with more conservative moral and economic ideals have, 
alas, hindered its implementation in many countries. Second, individu­
als who are infected with HIV can perhaps be morally discouraged 
when they plan to have children. Legal restrictions are probably too 
blunt an instrument for this purpose, but displays of moral and social 
disapproval could, arguably, be prima facie justified. Third, pregnan­
cies where the foetus is infected with HTV can be terminated, if the 
potential parent or parents see this as the right choice. Given that my 
general premise is valid, moral support can be justifiably provided in 
favour of the abortion decision, but legal regulations are, once again, 
out of the question. Fourth, infanticide is only a theoretical option, 
since nobody seems to advocate it seriously. But it should be kept in 
mind that if attempts to practice active infanticide are rejected on 
moral grounds, then the passive forms of ending the lives of newborn 
babies should probably also be censured.
Contesting the premises
If it is truly undesirable that children are bom with HTV, then I con­
clude that those who oppose the methods I have suggested are incon­
sistent and immoral. But maybe there is something wrong with my 
premises: perhaps it is not, after all, genuinely undesirable that chil­
dren are bom with HTV, or perhaps it does not follow from the unde­
sirability that the birth of such children should be prevented. What 
would people who hold these views have to say for themselves?
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One possibility is to redefine the key concepts of the case by refer­
ring to an allegedly analogous situation. The line of argument could be 
as follows. Criminal activities are undesirable, but this does not mean 
that they should be prevented by the excessive use of public resources. 
To say that these activities are undesirable is to say that the individu­
als who are involved in them should be punished by the rest of society. 
The situation is similar when it comes to women who give birth to 
HTV-positive babies. The babies are the innocent victims, and they de­
serve our sympathy, but the women should be legally punished for 
their irresponsible and immoral behaviour. And so (in case all this 
sounds too manifestly chauvinistic) should the men who knowingly 
participate in the conception of HIV-infected children.
The flaws of this view are, I hope, obvious. The retributive theory of 
justice and correction is, in and by itself, simplistic and illiberal 
enough, but the analogy drawn between deliberate criminality and the 
misfortune of having one’s child infected with HTV is appalling. This 
is clearly not the adequate answer to my question concerning the ne­
cessity of preventing the occurrence of undesirable states of affairs.
Another way to escape my conclusion is to state that to have chil­
dren who are HTV infected is undesirable only in the mild sense that 
we should all sympathise with the parents, not in the more demanding 
sense that we should do what we can to prevent such events. For the 
other members of the family, the birth of a potentially ill child gives an 
opportunity to re-evaluate their lives, and for the child itself to have a 
life which is comparatively short and painful is still better than to have 
no life at all.
I have no quarrel with the idea that when people are confronted with 
an unpleasant and inescapable situation they can and should reassess
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their lives and try to adjust themselves to the novel conditions. But the 
question is, is the birth of an afflicted child inescapable? If the meas­
ures I have suggested are taken, this is far from obvious. People can in 
the majority of cases abstain from having children, and when they can, 
they are not, I think, entitled to a great deal of sympathy for their 
choice to burden themselves and others by bringing into existence a 
suffering human being. Besides, the most important moral considera­
tion here is not the psychological welfare of the family but the well- or 
ill-being of the child. Many people seem to take for granted the idea 
that even a short and painful life is better than no life at all. But this 
axiological, or metaphysical, assumption is not self-evidently valid.
According to the prevailing, essentially Judeo-Christian, view hu­
man life is always good. It is, other things being equal, better to have a 
happy life than to have a miserable life, but even a miserable life is 
better than nothing. If a good life is, on a scale from zero to ten, worth 
the full ten points, a miserable life is worth at least five points, and 
only total non-existence credits none. But it is also possible to see the 
comparative values of existence and non-existence in an entirely dif­
ferent light. Stoic philosophers, for instance, believed that life can be­
come so unendurable that death, understood as an utter emptiness, is a 
better alternative. In these cases the Stoics themselves advocated the 
practice of rational suicide. On a ten-point scale, their theory could 
have stated, for example, that a good life is worth up to five points, 
non-existence nothing, and a miserable life down to minus five.
If the Stoic axiology is even remotely plausible, as I think it must 
be, then decisions to conceive and to give birth to HTV-infected chil­
dren cannot be unquestioningly condoned. If non-existence can be a 
better alternative than a miserable life, it cannot always be right to
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bring suffering human beings into this world. More likely, it is never 
right to do so.
Discrimination and moralism
Two tentative charges can be brought against the conclusions of this 
paper. First, my remarks can be seen as an instance of discrimination 
against individuals who decide to have children despite the risks of 
HIV and AIDS. With proper medication, only about one out of ten in­
fants of HIV-infected mothers contract the virus during the pregnancy 
or in birth. Yet greater risks are regularly taken by healthy, or appar­
ently healthy, individuals and couples in reproductive matters. Many 
genetic diseases can cause inordinate suffering, and even healthy chil­
dren can lead unhappy lives if they are not adequately cared for. Why, 
then, pick on HTV carriers?
I agree that it would be wrong to single out HTV carriers, and blame 
only them for bringing suffering children into existence. I do not, how­
ever, wish to restrict my comments to them. Everybody who intention­
ally or negligently allows avoidable suffering in reproductive matters 
is equally guilty, be the source of suffering medical, social or heredi­
tary. The reason why I concentrate on children bom infected with HTV 
in this paper is that their predicament is caused by the illiberal atti­
tudes of religious and public authorities more clearly that the fate of 
individuals who are faced, say, with genetic disorders. Hereditary dis­
eases cannot be eliminated by simple policy choices regarding sex 
education, contraception and drug use, whereas HTV infections could.
The second charge against my remarks is that social disapproval 
and moral contempt are harsh instruments of control, and should not 
be used lightly. If individuals are socially stigmatised merely for of-
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fending the sensitivities of others, in this case presumably my own, 
then greater suffering is inflicted on them in order to alleviate lesser 
suffering -  which would be wrong according to the principles I com­
mitted myself to at the outset of this paper.
But this seemingly critical point works, as a matter of fact, in favour 
of my suggestions, not against them. My foremost recommendation is, 
namely, that HIV-related suffering should primarily be prevented by 
giving up all moralistic regulations concerning sexual relations and 
intravenous drug use. Since genuine harm could be checked by liberal 
sex education and the free provision of clean syringes and needles, it 
would be wrong to respect the sensitivities of those who regard some 
forms of sex and drug use as immoral. An additional policy sugges­
tion, based on a comparison of social pressures, is that the pro-natal 
attitudes prevailing in most parts of the world should be briskly con­
tested. There is no reason to believe that people would actually prefer 
having children to not having them had they not been indoctrinated 
from childhood into thinking that marriage and children are intrinsi­
cally involved in the notion of a full human life. The induced sense of 
inadequacy and the social disapproval experienced by childless indi­
viduals and couples is definitely a factor in many reproductive deci­
sions in the face of possible future suffering. In this situation, the sug­
gested pressure against having children whose lives would be short 
and full of suffering could be seen as a countermeasure to the already 
existing mental coercion.
Here, however, my prima facie argument for creating moral pres­
sures against individuals who knowingly or negligently bring into ex­
istence suffering children runs into slightly paradoxical difficulties. 
Their decisions can be condemned only if they are free and uncoerced,
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but this is not the case in a world which favours the production of off­
spring regardless of the circumstances. To punish them for succumb­
ing to the prevailing attitudes would be unfair, as this would inflict 
suffering on them in order to prevent suffering on their offspring, 
which is not unproblematically acceptable within my normative 
framework. This means that subjecting parents of HIV-infected in­
fants to social disapproval and moral contempt would be justified only 
in a world where they would not be under pressure to reproduce, that 
is, in a world where they would probably not want to create suffering 
children in the first place. My argument can be pre-empted by holding 
on to the unethical pro-natal indoctrination.
But be that as it may, I conclude that if my analysis is correct, it is 
truly undesirable, indeed intolerable, that children are bom infected 
with HTV, and we do have every reason to try to prevent this from 
happening. The methods which can be employed in this preventive 
work depend on the ability of religious and public authorities to put 
their own moralistic prejudices on one side and to start doing what is 
necessary to decrease the amount of avoidable suffering in this world.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented in the 4 Justice and Euro­
pean Policy Conference’, Prague, Czech Republic, 8-9 September 1995, 
arranged by the Commission of the European Communities Biomedical and 
Health Research Programme Project AIDS: Ethics, Justice and European 
Policy. My thanks are due to the Coordinator of the Project, Professor John 
Harris, and to Tuija Takala, whose critical comments prompted me to sub­
stantially rewrite the paper, and to alleviate some of the provocativeness
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which resulted in a near-total rejection of my arguments in the Prague 
meeting.
1 E.g., P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, second edition 1993); J. Harris, Clones, 
Genes, and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
2 My position is more fully explained in M. Häyiy, Liberal Utilitarianism 
and Applied Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).
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4. Categorical Objections Against 
Genetic Engineering -  A Critique*
When new genetic technologies are examined and assessed within an 
ethical framework, two general types of objection are usually pre­
sented. First, some theorists appeal to the predictable consequences of 
employing gene technology. The core idea of the objection is to claim 
that the evil probably produced by genetic engineering exceeds the 
benefits probably flowing from its use. This approach has been 
dubbed in the literature as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘consequentialist’. Second, 
there are theorists who reject the first approach as amoral, and argue 
that ethical evaluations should always proceed from purely ethical 
considerations. Arguments of this second type can be labelled as 
‘categorical’ or ‘deontological’, and they range from complex theo­
logical accounts to simple commonsense expressions of disapproval.
Although I think that genuinely pragmatic reasons for and against 
gene technology are decisively important, I shall say virtually nothing 
about them in this paper. It is the second, deontological type of objec­
tion that interests me here, because it is in a sense more fundamental 
than its consequentialist rival. What I mean by this is that if deon­
tological theorists are right, they can establish the moral status of hu­
man activities -  such as genetic engineering -  quite independently of 
the expected consequences of those activities. One valid deontological 
objection against gene technology would be enough to put all conse­
quentialist moralists out of business in this field.
New genetic technologies include a variety of practices from the 
manipulation of plants and animals to attempts to alter the human
chromosomes. The categorical and deontological arguments have, 
however, mostly been restricted to human genetics, and I shall focus 
on this aspect of the issue. There are three major forms of human ge­
netics that have been regarded as morally dubious, and it is to these 
that I shall confine my attention. They are somatic cell therapy, germ­
line gene therapy, and the project to map the human genome. The 
medico-biological aim of these practices is to identify the genes which 
cause known diseases, and to cure these diseases by recombinant 
DNA techniques.1 Somatic cell therapy is intended to cure only the in­
dividuals who are actually being treated, whereas germ-line cell ther­
apy is expected to rectify hereditary disorders both in the patients 
themselves and in their descendants. The project to map the human 
genome is related to these therapeutical applications in that reliable 
knowledge concerning the chromosomal structure of human beings 
would be quite invaluable to medical personnel when diagnoses are 
being made.
Is genetic engineering dangerous?
The difference between ‘pragmatic’ and ‘categorical’ arguments can 
be illustrated by studying one basic objection against the use of bio­
technology, namely the apparently simple statement that ‘genetic engi­
neering is dangerous’. Two interpretations can be given to this objec­
tion.
First, the point of the argument may be that the genetic engineering 
of human beings is physically dangerous to certain identifiable indi­
viduals. For instance, many experimental animals lose their lives in 
biotechnological research. Human embryos and pre-embryos are also 
subjected to scientific experiments, and their lives are in similar dan-
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ger. And although the embryos subjected to therapeutical gene ma­
nipulation would have the status of patients, their chances of survival 
would still be rather low until the treatments have developed beyond 
the experimental level. Even adult patients, embryo patients who sur­
vive the therapy, and the offspring of these groups may be in peril, 
since the manipulation of genes can cause new diseases as well as cure 
existing ones. Finally, genetic engineering as a whole is an expensive 
high tech enterprise which will possibly benefit only multinational 
corporations and a handful of affluent Westerners who suffer from 
obscure ailments. If scarce medical resources are primarily allocated 
to the development of gene therapy, more important projects such as 
sanitation and social security may have to be abandoned, and vast 
masses of people, especially in the Third World, will be endangered.2
The distinctive feature of all objections based on these and similar 
claims is that their structure is conditional. Genetic engineering, ac­
cording to the objections, is dangerous only if at least one of the 
claims concerning its undesirable entailments is valid. Put the other 
way around, this implies that unless at least one of the remarks and 
predictions about present and future evils is true or reasonably prob­
able, there is no tenable objection against gene technology. It is this 
possibility that makes objections based on physical danger pragmatic 
or conditional as opposed to absolute or categorical.
Second, however, the point of the argument may also be that genetic 
engineering is dangerous in some moral or symbolic rather than physi­
cal sense. Many theorists and a number of lay persons seem to think 
that gene technology is somehow inherently and irrevocably ‘im­
moral’, either because it violates the rules set by the human commu­
nity, or because it is against the higher laws of God or Nature. The
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objections based on these ideas are genuinely categorical, since the 
immorality of the practice under evaluation is supposed to be intrinsic 
(or conceptual) and therefore beyond empirical testing.
If immorality is taken to mean deviation from rules set by humans, 
the claim that genetic engineering is immoral does not have much bite. 
Rules set by humans can be altered by humans, and therefore laws and 
regulations prohibiting genetic experiments and therapies do not by 
themselves prove anything about the ultimate ethical wrongness of 
these activities. On the other hand, if the objection is based on sponta­
neous human sentiments, the difficulty is to bridge the gap between 
those sentiments and critical morality. Feelings certainly influence the 
opinions that people have on ethical issues, but it has never been con­
clusively shown that feelings should be uncritically allowed to enter 
reflective moral judgements. The fear and suspicion people may feel 
towards gene technology does not, therefore, count as a valid objection 
against it.
If, however, immorality is taken to mean transgressions of the divine 
or natural laws, the matter is at once far more complicated. Those 
who oppose genetic engineering may say, for instance, that to interfere 
with the human germ line would be ‘unnatural’ or ‘against God’s will’ 
or an instance of ‘playing God’. But what exactly do these expressions 
mean? Can they be translated into plain language which could be un­
derstood without prior commitment to theological or metaphysical 
systems?
Six ways of playing God
Ruth Chadwick has thoroughly analysed and assessed the argument of 
‘playing God’.3 According to her analysis, the objection that an action
4 7
is wrong because it is an instance of playing God has two different 
meanings in two different kinds of setting. In the context of sensitive 
medical decision-making the point of the objection is that human be­
ings are in no position to decide legitimately about each other’s fates 
on the basis of quality-of-life judgements. In the context of new medi­
cal technologies, again, the crux of the argument is that actions de- 
scribable as playing God can lead to disastrous and unpredictable 
consequences. These two aspects are both present in certain forms of 
genetic engineering, such as germ-line gene therapy, and it is therefore 
useful to take a closer look at Chadwick’s account.
With regard to the decision aspect of the playing-God objection, 
Chadwick distinguishes three major lines of argument, two of which 
she finds untenable.4 First, the wrongness of playing God can be based 
on the idea that it is God’s prerogative to give life and to take it away. 
Active euthanasia, for instance, has been attacked by referring to this 
notion. But the problem here is that no reasonable morality condemns 
doctors and nurses who do their best to save and prolong lives, al­
though this work can, according to the interpretation, be described as 
playing God. Second, the point of the objection may be that in certain 
matters the natural course of events should be preferred to human in­
terference. An example of such matters is the reallocation of health 
through medical decisions. To kill one patient in order to save two 
others would be the best thing to do in crude utilitarian terms, but it 
would also be a hideous instance of playing God.5 In situations like 
this, so the argument goes, doctors can act morally only by letting 
nature take its course. The obvious difficulty in this second interpre­
tation is that whatever decisions doctors make, they cannot help play­
ing God in the defined sense. Refusals to alter the ‘natural’ course of
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events affect the patients and their lives as much as any positive ac­
tion.
Third, the formulation that Chadwick finds plausible and morally 
relevant is founded on the equality and limited knowledge of human 
beings. In matters concerning life and death we may justifiably feel 
that no one else is qualified to judge whether our lives are worth liv­
ing. This conviction stems from two factors. On the one hand, it can 
be argued that every human life has equal value, and that no person or 
group has the right to make decisions concerning the lives of others on 
assumptions of inequality. It is not, for instance, justifiable to allocate 
scarce life-saving medical treatments on the basis of quality-of-life 
measurements.6 On the other hand, even assuming that some human 
lives are more valuable than others, the judgements concerning them 
may require superhuman capacities. The traditional theological as­
sumption is that while human beings are imperfect and their knowl­
edge limited, God is omniscient. This implies that even if God, as an 
omniscient being, could pass valid judgements concerning human 
lives, the comparisons made by human beings would still be mere ar­
rogant instances of playing God.7
As Chadwick herself notes, the playing-God objection may in this 
third form have some moral relevance as a reminder of the limits of 
our knowledge. It may also serve as a counsel or warning against em­
ploying irrelevant criteria, like life quality, in the inescapable human 
decisions concerning life and death. But the objection is not by itself 
sufficiently strong to refute any actual practices.
With regard to the technology aspect of the playing-God objection, 
Chadwick argues that divine omnipotence rather than divine omnis­
cience provides the key to this side of the issue.8 People who oppose
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activities like genetic engineering or artificial reproduction typically 
see these technologies as attempts to rival God’s power by trying to 
create life or life-forms.9 When it comes to artificial insemination and 
in vitro fertilisation, the counterargument can be made, as Chadwick 
in fact does, that reproductive technology only aims at rearranging 
materials, not at creating previously nonexistent entities. The same is 
not, however, quite true with regard to genetic engineering, which 
may, after all, create completely new life-forms. Admittedly, new life- 
forms have been created for centuries by animal and plant breeding. 
But these processes have been relatively slow, and humans have not 
been explicitly included in the programme. The opponents of genetic 
engineering may wish to argue that there are certain limits beyond 
which human beings cannot go without unlawfully playing God.
If  this idea of fixed moral limits is taken seriously, the next step is to 
find out where the lines have been drawn and by whom. Chadwick 
considers three possibilities.10 First, playing God can be understood
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literally, as a transgression of the invisible boundaries that separate 
immortal gods from mortal human beings. People who try to assume 
the role of gods are guilty of what the ancient Greeks used to call ‘hu­
bris’, that is, of excessive pride. In the Greek mythology, overstepping 
the limits set by a divine will was generally punished in unusual and 
cruel ways. This literal interpretation of the playing-God objection is 
clear and intelligible, but its value as a moral guide is suspect. No 
critical morality can be based on the assumption that divine beings 
have set us limits which they continuously protect. Even if one be­
lieved in the existence of such divinities and in the sacredness of their 
will, it would be impossible to discover what the chosen deity would 
want us to do. In fact, one could well argue that the humans who pre-
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tend to be acquainted with the divine will are in fact putting them­
selves in the divine role, and thereby themselves playing God.
Second, the playing-God objection in the context of medical tech­
nologies may also be meant to state that the natural environment as a 
whole sets certain limits to our action. Humankind has during the last 
few decades acquired powers which could be used to destroy most of 
the biosphere. Many people seem to think that genetic engineering is 
one of these powers, and they fear that, for instance, the release of ge­
netically altered organisms into the environment may have irreversible 
ecological consequences. Assuming that we are interested in the pres­
ervation of the biosphere, this objection against genetic engineering 
does indeed have some moral relevance. But the problem is that the 
appeal to consequences, which gives this argument its weight, also de­
prives it of its categorical disguise. It would, no doubt, be pragmati­
cally unwise to destroy the only environment where we can live at pre­
sent, but this does not amount to a categorical rejection of genetic en­
gineering. The wrongness of the activity remains conditional upon the 
actual consequences.
Third, the limits of playing God can be set by human beings on the 
ground that certain actions, especially technology-related actions 
which have never been taken before, are liable to produce unforeseen, 
unpleasant and unpredictable consequences. Despite the appeal to 
consequences, this approach may be genuinely categorical, since no 
weight is given to the nature of the feared outcome or to the probabil­
ity or improbability of its occurrence. According to Chadwick, the 
logic of the playing-God objection here is that the unknown conse­
quences of going beyond (present) human limits cause fear, anxiety 
and uneasiness in many people.11 Some of these people believe that we
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will be faced with unimaginable disaster if new technologies are im­
plemented. Others may have the feeling, unjustified perhaps but 
nonetheless painful, that divine retribution will follow the alleged hu­
man arrogance. And still others may be worried about the preservation 
of the current worldview, which may suffer from the breakdown of its 
customary limits.
None of these negative feelings amounts, by itself, to an independent 
refutation of new technologies. But as Chadwick points out, the ap­
peal to unforeseen consequences may be taken as a counsel advising 
us to be very careful in assessing certain delicate decisions. If the pros 
and cons of a given new technology are otherwise equal, the scales can 
be tipped by the unpleasantness inflicted on people by the mere 
thought of the innovation.
Are genetic engineers playing God?
Let me now summarise those parts of Chadwick’s account which are 
relevant to my own question concerning genetic engineering and the 
alleged categorical wrongness of playing God. The development of 
gene technology is obviously subject to the remarks concerning unpre­
dictable consequences. But, as we have seen, the only way in which 
this unpredictability can be brought to bear on the moral assessment 
of genetic engineering is through the fears and anxieties that people 
may have. This means that the technology aspect of the playing-God 
objection must be expressed in pragmatic and conditional terms after 
all. Gene-splicing, as an instance of ‘playing God’, is morally objec­
tionable only if people’s feelings are strong enough to outweigh the 
expected net utility of employing the technique. The playing-God 
complaint, understood in this way, is not a categorical claim, but an
5 2
appeal to empirical facts which can be verified or falsified by obser­
vation and testing.
As regards the decision aspect of the matter, the playing-God objec­
tion can be interpreted as a warning against large scale eugenic pro­
grammes. What I have in mind are genetic programmes which would 
aim at altering the human phenotype, either nationally or globally, to 
accord with the aesthetic or ethical views of scientists, politicians or 
others who claim to possess expert knowledge concerning the ‘ideal 
human nature’. The possession of such knowledge would indeed re­
quire divine omniscience, and the majority of people would probably 
like to state that in this particular context the playing-God objection is 
valid without reservations. It should be noted, however, that the argu­
ment does not refute genetic engineering as such, but rather its misap­
plication to political purposes. One does not condemn conventional 
medicine on the ground that medical skills can be employed in the exe­
cution of cruel and mutilating punishments. Similarly, one should not 
condemn biotechnology because it could be misused to create mon­
strous future dystopias.
Whether or not the argument against eugenic programming is cate­
gorical is a matter of some dispute. The theorist who prefers prag­
matic interpretations can argue that the ultimate reason for rejecting 
the programmes is the decrease of happiness which is expected to re­
sult from them. The opponents of this view, in their turn, can reply 
that the expected outcome in terms of human pleasure or happiness is 
not decisive, since there are stronger, deontological reasons for ban­
ning designs to alter people. These deontological reasons cannot in­
clude appeals to ‘playing God’ or ‘God’s will’, because those are the 
concepts we are trying to analyse here. But an alternative can be
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found in the claim that genetic engineering, especially when it takes 
the form of manufacturing human beings, is ‘unnatural’ or ‘against 
nature’.
Is genetic engineering unnatural?
The mere statement that an action is unnatural does not, of course, 
prove that the action in question is immoral, let alone that it ought to 
be banned.12 Phenomena and practices which are rare, new, alien, or in 
any other way deviate from the everyday experience are often labelled 
by common sense as unnatural. But there is surely nothing inherently 
immoral in actions which are infrequent or previously not seen or 
heard of. More sophisticated analyses for the concepts of natural and 
unnatural are not always helpful, either. Take, for instance, the inter­
pretations criticised by Ruth Chadwick: actions are unnatural if they 
interfere with the natural course of events, or put life on Earth in jeop­
ardy.13 As for interfering with the course of nature, people have been 
doing exactly that for centuries, and most of the interventions have 
never been regarded as immoral. On the contrary, it could well be ar­
gued that once the significance of, say, hygiene, adequate nutrition and 
health care was discovered, it became a moral duty to employ these 
measures against the ‘natural course of events’, which would lead to 
diseases and starvation. And as for protecting life on Earth, the rea­
sons for a preservationist policy seem to be conditional rather than 
categorical. Whether or not an activity can be considered unnatural 
depends on its consequences, not on its intrinsic qualities. No logical 
connection exists between actions which are unnatural in the defined 
two senses and actions which are ‘categorically’ immoral.
An attempt to formulate and employ the argument of unnaturalness
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against genetic engineering can be found in the report of the Enquete 
Commission to the German Bundestag.14 The Commission tackled 
three questions which are fundamental to the issue, namely the defini­
tion of the natural as opposed to the unnatural, the reasons for prefer­
ring naturalness to unnaturalness, and the division of different kinds of 
biotechnology according to their natural and unnatural characteristics.
As for the question of definition, the development of individual hu­
man beings was regarded in the report as natural only if it is not de­
termined by technical production or social recognition. Technological 
and social processes can, according to the Commission’s view, pro­
duce only unnatural artifacts.
The value of promoting naturalness and avoiding artificial elements 
in practices which concern human development was linked in the re­
port with the need to protect the humanity and dignity of human be­
ings. Our humanity, so the Commission asserted, ‘rests at its core on 
natural development’, and our dignity ‘is based essentially on the 
naturalness of our origins’.15 If technological or social interventions 
are allowed, then the result is that people will be created by other peo­
ple, and the Commission regarded this possibility with extreme suspi­
cion. Human beings whose existence and personal qualities depend on 
the planning or caprice of other human beings are not free persons in 
the foil meaning of the term, and their lives lack the individual worth 
of naturally developed human lives. It is the untampered chance of 
nature that secures our independence from other people, our personal 
freedom, and our individual worth as human beings.16
These considerations lead to the following normative views regard­
ing different kinds of human genetic engineering. First, somatic cell 
therapies performed on foetuses, infants and adult human beings are,
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at the moment, justifiable as experimental treatments. Whether or not 
such treatments should be abandoned or condoned in the future re­
mains to be judged by their practical success. But the humanity of in­
dividuals is not threatened by the use of genetic medicine when the in­
dividuals in question have already developed into the beings that they 
‘naturally’ are. Second, the mapping of the human genome is legiti­
mate as long as it is employed to diagnose the need for somatic cell 
therapies. The potential use of gene maps for other (eugenic) purposes 
is more controversial. Third, cloning and large-scale eugenic pro­
grammes must according to the report be banned as gross instances of 
manufacturing people. And fourth, if a strict interpretation is given to 
the Commission’s ideas concerning naturalness, germ-line gene thera­
pies must also be prohibited. All interventions in the germ lines of in­
dividuals diminish, according to the foregoing argument, their inde­
pendence, uniqueness, and worth as human beings.17
The opinions among the Enquete Commission diverged, however, 
regarding the legitimacy of germ-line gene therapies. Only some mem­
bers of the Commission upheld the strict interpretation of naturalness, 
while others advanced a more moderate view. The core of the latter, 
moderate interpretation is that the medical corrections of obvious de­
fects are not unnatural, as they do ‘not manufacture the human ge­
nome capriciously, but measure it against nature, that is, good 
health.’18 Illness and suffering can be a part of a person’s identity, but 
if they are prevented before the person even exists, there is no point in 
maintaining that her or his individuality is unlawfully changed or ma­
nipulated. The genetic treatment of early embryos is, so the moderate 
reading goes, directly comparable to any conventional treatment of 
foetuses and neonates who cannot give their consent to the proce-
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dures.19
The divergence of opinions within the Commission is, no doubt, an 
interesting detail for those who believe that the unnaturalness objec­
tion is tenable as such. There are, however, several good reasons for 
thinking that this is not the case.
First, the argument from unnaturalness seems to apply to many 
practices which have been traditionally considered quite acceptable. If 
genetic engineering is to be condemned due to its power to change in­
dividuals by technical means, then most medical interventions should 
be condemned as well. Surgical operations, for instance, often alter 
people by transforming them from fatally ill patients into perfectly 
healthy citizens. And changes of personal identity may be even more 
drastic in the case of radical psychiatric treatments.20
Second, the Commission’s argument presupposes theoretical ele­
ments which are by no means universally accepted. The report’s en­
tirely biological view concerning personal identity is a case in point. 
According to the view, human beings are who they are and what they 
are almost exclusively owing to the arrangement of their genes. Cul­
ture, education and social environment cannot significantly change the 
individual’s identity, only biotechnology can do that. Very few phi­
losophers today believe that such a strict biological definition of per­
sonality and individuality could be credibly defended.21 Another pre­
supposition in the report which can be criticised is its underlying view 
of human freedom and independence. The argument requires that hu­
man beings can be free from each other’s influence in the sense that 
people are not ‘manufactured’ by other people. This is obviously true 
if the manufacturing of people is understood literally: human beings 
cannot at the moment be mechanically created by each other except in
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science fiction. But when it comes to less obtrusive types of interac­
tion, it is also true that people simply cannot survive and function 
without the often restrictive and moulding presence of other people. 
Human freedom without the individual’s dependence on others is only 
an abstraction with no reality to it.
Third, the unnaturalness objection presented in the report rests on 
the assumption that genetic engineering would undermine the worth, 
humanity and dignity of the individuals produced by using the tech­
nique. This assumption is not only dubious but it may be positively 
insulting towards those human beings who will be bom in the future 
genetically altered or cloned, perhaps against prevailing laws. The 
depth of the actual insult depends upon the interpretation that one 
gives to the Commission’s view. One possibility is to state that, ac­
cording to the report, genetically engineered individuals would in fact 
lack humanity, dignity and personal freedom because their chromo­
somes have been tampered with. This line of argument would obvi­
ously be unreasonably unfair towards the individuals in question. An­
other possibility would be to assume that the Commission did not dis­
cuss the objective worth of human life in the first place, but the indi­
vidual’s subjective sense of worth in her or his life. The argument 
would then be that genetic engineering is wrong because the knowl­
edge of one’s ‘artificial’ and ‘unnatural’ origin reduces one’s sense of 
worth and dignity. And yet another possibility is to claim that other 
people’s adverse attitudes will make genetically engineered individuals 
unhappy.
The statements concerning attitudes can, no doubt, materialise under 
predictable circumstances. But since people’s attitudes towards them­
selves and towards others are subject to change, the argument in this
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form is conditional rather than categorical. If genetically altered hu­
man beings can be expected to have difficulties in coping with the 
question of their origins, these difficulties may constitute a weak 
prima facie case against germ-line gene therapy, cloning and eugenic 
programmes. But this does not imply that these practices could be 
categorically rejected.
Conclusions
It seems, then, that appeals to the unnaturalness of biotechnology do 
not amount to tenable categorical arguments against its use. Nor do 
these appeals lend any support to the playing-God objections dis­
cussed in the above. In fact, the only thing of any normative value to 
be deduced from the unnaturalness objection is the fear that people 
may come to see and treat genetically engineered individuals as infe­
rior to other human beings. But the significance of this point is mini­
mal, since, first, people do not need to know who is genetically altered, 
and, second, there is no reason to believe that people’s attitudes to­
wards each other would be dependent upon what they know about 
each other’s genomes.
On a more general level, it seems that the allegedly categorical ob­
jections against gene manipulation do not in the end merit the attention 
that they have been given in the literature. Such objections are em­
ployed frequently and without discrimination, but closer scrutiny ei­
ther dissolves them entirely or reveals that their sound core, if any, is 
conditional or pragmatic. This is true about the playing-God objec­
tion, which can be interpreted as a counsel or reminder against forget­
ting improbable consequences and people’s feelings. The same is true 
about the unnaturalness objection, which can serve as a warning
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against making people whose human worth and dignity will be ques­
tioned either by themselves or by others. But no decisive arguments 
for or against genetic engineering can be found from these quarters. 
The ultimate justification or rejection of biotechnology must be based 
on pragmatic considerations.
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poses that a tenable distinction can be drawn between the two practices.
The alleged difference between gene therapies and genetic improvement 
programmes is that the former is aimed at eliminating hereditary diseases 
while the latter is intended to bring about or intensify some positive quali­
ties in future individuals. This distinction is unclear, as it is obvious that 
illness may hinder the development of certain positive qualities and pro­
mote the development of others. A physically disabling disease, for in­
stance, may prevent the individual from being strong and athletic (which 
are often regarded as ‘good qualities’), but it may indirectly promote the 
individual’s willingness to learn useful cognitive and artistic skills (which 
are also often considered good).
The main point to be noted here, however, is that the argument which 
supports gene therapy on individuals can also be used to defend demo­
graphic genetic changes which are not, strictly speaking, disease-related. 
The justification for bypassing the patient’s consent is, according to the 
moderate view, the best interest of the patient her or himself. How could 
positive improvements in the patient’s best interest be ruled out if the 
elimination of negative factors in the patient’s best interest is accepted?
20 Besides, as the Commission’s moderates note, there are social arrange­
ments, such as marriage rules, which have been interfering with the ‘natu­
ral’ human gene pool for millennia, thereby modifying the qualities of in­
dividuals. To condemn germ-line gene therapies categorically would re­
quire the condemnation of all these social practices as well. See ‘A report 
from Germany’ 1988, 259.
21 For a critique, see, e.g., H.-M. Sass, ‘A critique of the Enquete Commis­
sion’s report’, Bioethics 2 (1988): 264-275, 269.
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5. What the Fox Would Have Said,
Had He Been a Hedgehog 
- On the methodology and normative approach 
of John Harris’s Wonderwoman and Superm an
LADY BRACKNELL: I would strongly advise you, Mr. Wor­
thing, to try and acquire some relations as soon as possible, and 
to make a definite effort to produce at any rate one parent, of ei­
ther sex, before the season is quite over.
- Oscar Wilde, The Importance o f Being Earnest.
Philosophical books on real-life moral issues can be assessed on many 
grounds, most importantly according to their contents and conclu­
sions, style and clarity of presentation, their general significance, and 
the methodology and normative approach chosen by the author.
John Harris’s Wonderwoman and Superman is an important and 
comprehensive study of the moral and legal dimensions of human 
biotechnology, including assisted reproduction, organ transplants and 
the possibilities of genetic engineering. The arguments for and against 
suggested solutions have been presented forcefully and clearly, and the 
style throughout the book is spontaneous, witty and provocative. The 
conclusions, which are always convincing and most often exceedingly 
liberal, are well argued and ingeniously defended against many popu­
lar objections.
My aim in this comment is, however, to examine the methodology 
and normative approach employed by Professor Harris in Wonder-
woman and Superman. I shall argue that the ethical theory behind his 
reasoning, although not systematically presented, can be easily traced, 
and that the justifications he gives for this theory and for his norma­
tive conclusions are equally detectable. I shall, furthermore, argue that 
the few occasions where the conclusions drawn in the book are less 
than obviously acceptable arise either because Professor Harris inad­
vertently flirts with axiological views which are not necessarily com­
patible with his overall theory, or because he tries to extend the scope 
of his moral doctrine too far.
What the fox thinks he is doing
In a chapter dealing with research on embryos Professor Harris intro­
duces a distinction, originally made by Isaiah Berlin, which is useful 
here. He divides people into two categories according to their ways of 
thinking and justifying their views. ‘There are those,’ he writes, ‘who 
pursue many ideas and those who like to bring everything under one 
central vision or organizing principle. The latter are hedgehogs, the 
former are foxes.’2
In the introduction of Wonderwoman and Superman Professor Har­
ris clearly counts himself among the foxes of applied philosophy, at 
least for the purposes of the present book. He writes:
While this book is about the ethics of human biotechnology I 
have not here attempted to give any general introduction to 
moral philosophy, nor have I tried to outline in general terms my 
own basic approach to ethics. I have tried rather to let the argu­
ments speak for themselves. There is always a danger when la-
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bels are attached to philosophical positions for people to assume 
that if they reject a particular school of philosophy in general, or 
adhere to a different philosophical tradition or approach, they 
can safely ignore or reject arguments from another school of 
philosophy. But most philosophical schools are united by their 
demand for rational argument and for the justification of moral 
conclusions. What matters is the quality of arguments, reasons, 
and justifications produced. Here I am interested simply in what 
can be said for and against using biotechnology in various ways.3
The suggestion is, then, that it would be futile and even dangerous to 
do what the hedgehog would do, that is, to inform the readers of the 
organizing principle or principles of the author’s moral views, since 
the information could unnecessarily alienate the readership. Instead, 
Professor Harris wants to be the fox who pursues all the ideas that 
members of various philosophical schools have put forward, employ­
ing as his only criterion of rightness the quality of particular argu­
ments and justifications.
What the fox would have been doing, 
had he been a hedgehog
The difficulty with assuming the strategy of the fox in the analysis of 
practical moral problems is, however, that the flow and exchange of 
arguments can usually be halted only if a consensus is reached, or 
when the justification process has advanced to fundamental principles 
which are not open to any further proof. When it comes to controver­
sial issues like biotechnology, the chances of finding universal agree­
ment are slim. Therefore, two questions arise here. The first is, does 
Professor Harris always arrive at different axioms at the end of his
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arguments, thereby reinstating his position as a philosophical fox? The 
second is, if he does not, what are the basic principles he employs to 
support his arguments?
The answer to the first question is clearly negative -  the ultimate 
justification of policies and actions can in all the cases dealt with in 
the book be traced down to a limited number of moral axioms. This, 
of course, is not surprising to those who are acquainted with Professor 
Harris’s previous work, especially Violence and Responsibility and 
The Value o f  Life* Neither is it surprising that the basic ethical tenets 
employed in Wonderwoman and Superman are of the type that is usu­
ally dubbed in the literature as consequentialist or utilitarian. There 
are three normative principles which are essential to Professor Har­
ris’s view, and to the arguments he presents for and against particular 
uses of biotechnology.
The first is the principle of consequentialism, which can be stated 
as follows:
(1) The moral status (rightness or wrongness) of acts and omis­
sions depends on the probable beneficial and harmful con­
sequences of these acts and omissions to individuals who are 
worthy of moral consideration.5
A few comments and specifications must be added to this brief for­
mulation.
Professor Harris believes, as all utilitarian philosophers should, that 
acts and omissions are in themselves morally symmetrical, in other 
words, that it is equally right or wrong to bring about beneficial or
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harmful consequences by actively doing something and by passively 
allowing things to happen.6 In order to be morally responsible for the 
consequences of their actions, however, agents must be aware of them. 
The rightness or wrongness of moral choices is determined by their 
expected, or probable, or foreseeable, outcome, not necessarily by the 
consequences that actually occur.7
As regards the semantics of normative statements, Professor Harris 
seems to follow the usage established by the utilitarians of the early 
twentieth century.8 If an action is wrong, it is morally prohibited, that 
is, it ought not to be performed. If, on the other hand, an action is 
right, it can be either obligatory or merely permissible. In the former 
case it is our duty to undertake the action, in the latter case it is not 
our duty to perform it, nor to forgo it. The distinction between duties 
and other right actions is in Professor Harris’s theory, as in most 
utilitarian doctrines, slightly vague.
Individuals who are worthy of moral consideration can according to 
Professor Harris’s view be divided into two groups. Persons, that is, 
individuals who are capable of valuing their own lives, should be 
equally entitled to life, liberty, and the avoidance of needless suffering. 
Sentient beings who are not persons should not be subjected to unnec­
essary pain or anguish. Individuals who will in the foreseeable future 
develop into persons need not be respected as the potential persons 
they presently are, but they are worthy of moral consideration as the 
primary medium, or raw material, of the persons they will become.9
One dimension of the principle of consequentialism is that it rules 
out many other approaches to moral issues. Among the solutions that 
are more or less explicitly rejected in Wonderwomcm and Superman 
are religious ethics,10 deontological arguments11 and a doctrine that
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Professor Harris calls ‘moral sentimentalism’.12 The moral sentimen­
talist believes that actions and policies should be banned if they evoke 
feelings of outrage.
The second axiom of Professor Harris’s theory, already touched 
upon in the passage concerning the moral standing of individuals, is 
the principle of negative utilitarianism, which can be expressed in the 
following form:
(2) It is wrong deliberately to bring about or to allow avoidable 
harm or suffering.13
One specification is worth mentioning here. As a partial definition of 
the concept of avoidability, Professor Harris asserts that ‘suffering is 
avoidable where an individual who is or will be disabled can be re­
placed with an individual who is not disabled’.14 I shall return to this 
point in the critical part of my comment.
The third cornerstone of utilitarianism is the principle of equality, or 
strict impartiality, which states:
(3) The lives and fundamental interests of each individual 
should be granted equal weight, equal consideration and 
equal respect in ethical decision-making.15
Like many self-confessed utilitarians, Professor Harris employs this 
axiom in order to tackle the questions of fairness and justice. The 
principle of strict impartiality is not, in fact, generally regarded as an 
efficient tool for the evaluation of competing models of distribution
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and retribution. But within the utilitarian framework it establishes 
firmly the norm of anti-favouritism. When the beneficial and harmful 
consequences of policies and actions are assessed, no weight should be 
given to the possibility that some of those affected by the choices can 
be emotionally, genetically, racially or ethnically related to the indi­
viduals who make the decisions.
In addition to these normative moral principles Professor Harris also 
seems to recognize a distinct metaethical view, which can perhaps be 
called rational intuitionism. At least the following points are included 
in this view:
(4) All moral choices and principles should be justified by rational 
arguments.16 These arguments, in their turn, must ultimately be 
based either on the normal usage of language,17 the cool consid­
eration of rational preferences,18 or on thought experiments in­
volving hypothetical, and often exceedingly fanciful, examples.19
The idea that ethical decisions ought to be justified by good arguments 
encapsulates, of course, the official ethos of the book, stated in the in­
troduction. The specifications concerning language, rational prefer­
ences and imaginary examples can be found in the chapters dealing 
with the substantive issues of biotechnology.
Where the fox has stuck his nose into the spines
The moral theory underlying the arguments of Wonderwoman and 
Superman is, then, a version of modem utilitarianism, not unlike the 
doctrines employed, for instance, by R.M. Hare, Jonathan Glover and 
Peter Singer.20 It will be remembered that the rationale Professor Har­
ris gives for his decision not to define the view in his book is that
7 0
many readers could be adversely affected by the information. This 
concern can, for all I know, be either justified or groundless. But there 
is another, entirely unrelated reason which makes me at least believe 
that the book could have been even better had its moral framework 
been explicitly stated at the outset. The reason is that certain norma­
tive points made by Professor Harris seem to be incompatible with the 
principles of negative utilitarianism and with some of the conclusions 
he reaches. This, I think, may not have happened if he had been forced 
to examine the results against the background of a definite set of 
moral axioms.
Three passages in Wonderwoman and Superman stand out as ex­
amples of incongruence. These are:
(i) If children are wanted, it is better to have healthy children 
than to have disabled children where these are alternatives, and 
it is better to have children with disabilities than to have no chil­
dren at all.21
(ii) [It] seems to me clearly wrong for human beings to decide to 
destroy the world. [...] However, the wrong of all presently ex­
isting individuals, say, simply deciding not to reproduce, simply 
deciding that the present generation should be the last, is of a 
different order. It is different because it would not involve vio­
lating the will to live of any person, nor the destruction of the 
ecosystem. [But] it would I think be wrong for two distinct and 
important reasons. The first is that it would be to prefer a uni­
verse with less happiness and less satisfaction of desires than the 
alternative in which persons did continue to exist, and secondly
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because it might involve the permanent end of the only creatures 
anywhere who have both these capacities.22
(iii) If your child is suffering from fatal kidney disease and mine 
has the only available kidney, would I be wrong to risk my child 
to save yours? I do not think that I would in fact do so, but that is 
because I am a parent and I have fierce protective feelings to­
wards my child.23
Let me explain why these statements are at odds with the general ethos 
of the book, and what could be done to straighten the situation.
(i) In the first passage Professor Harris asserts that if individuals 
want children, ‘it is better to have children with disabilities than to 
have no children at all’,24 in other words, that it is better to bring 
about suffering than to refrain from doing so.25 He supports this ap­
parently anti-utilitarian view by arguing that in certain situations suf­
fering is unavoidable, and when it is, the principle of negative utili­
tarianism does not prohibit slightly harmful actions. According to his 
definition, suffering is unavoidable, for instance, when individuals 
who cannot have healthy children nonetheless want to produce their 
own offspring.26
But to define the concept of ‘unavoidable’ in this way is to contra­
dict the principles of rational intuitionism. In his critique of Joel Fein- 
berg’s views on harming and wronging, Professor Harris argues, rea­
sonably I think, that ‘to be harmed is to be put in a condition that is 
harmful’,27 and that Feinberg’s more artificial definition ‘is strongly 
counter-intuitive’.28 Similar remarks can be extended to Professor 
Harris’s own account of avoidable suffering. To say that a result is 
unavoidable is surely to say that the result in question cannot be
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avoided, not that it can be avoided only by refraining from action.29 If 
individuals can abstain from having children, as they in most cases 
can, the suffering they produce by bringing into existence a disabled 
child seems to be, following our linguistic intuitions, avoidable, and 
therefore also unacceptable.
(ii) In the second passage Professor Harris states that the voluntary 
self-extinction of humankind would be wrong, because 6 it would be to 
prefer a universe with less happiness and less satisfaction of desires 
than the alternative in which persons did continue to exist’.30 This 
view is clearly utilitarian in nature, but it represents the ‘positive’ 
rather than the ‘negative’ version of the doctrine. The principle em­
ployed here makes it our moral duty to maximize happiness and happy 
individuals, whereas the axiom used elsewhere in the book restricts 
our duties to the minimization of misery and pain.
The problem with the expanded model of moral obligations is that it 
is incompatible with some of the conlusions reached in Wonderwoman 
and Superman. Professor Harris makes it clear that abortion at the 
request of the pregnant woman should always be permitted. As he puts 
the matter: ‘She wrongs no one because in ending the life of the fetus 
she deprives the fetus of nothing that it can value and she benefits no 
one since there is no one she brings into existence.’31 But if happiness 
and happy lives ought to be maximized, it is difficult to see how 
aborting a healthy and potentially well-off fetus could ever be permis­
sible. This would, after all, mean that the decision-maker prefers a 
universe with less happiness to a universe with more. It would be 
equally problematical to condone contraception or celibacy, if the al­
ternative is to bring into existence healthy and happy human beings.
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(iii) In the third passage Professor Harris informs us that he would 
not risk his child to save mine, because he has fierce protective feel­
ings towards his own offspring. This decision violates the rule of 
equality, or strict impartiality. As William Godwin wrote in evaluating 
the choice between the lives of a known benefactor and the rescuer’s 
own father or brother: ‘What magic is there in the pronoun “my”, that 
should justify us in overturning the decisions of impartial truth? My 
brother or my father may be a fool or a profligate, malicious, lying or 
dishonest. If they be, what consequence is it that they are mine?’32 
Godwin concluded that if more happiness can be brought into the 
world by rescuing the benefactor, it would be immoral to save the life 
of one’s own father or brother.
The conclusion that Professor Harris draws in his own example can, 
I think, be justified more easily than Godwin’s choice. But on the 
other hand, Godwin’s result is consistent with the principle of equal­
ity, while Professor Harris’s decision is not. What this implies, in my 
opinion, is that the requirement of strict impartiality ought to be re­
jected in situations where the basic interests, or basic needs, of indi­
viduals are in conflict.33 The classical utilitarian rules of the minimi­
zation of suffering and the maximization of happiness cannot be rea­
sonably employed if the security of one person ought to be sacrificed 
in order to promote the welfare of another. Any acceptable moral the­
ory must recognize at least our entitlement to defend ourselves, and 
those we care for, against peril.
What the veterinarian can do
If  I have interpreted the arguments and results of Wondenvoman and 
Superman correctly, two points are worth mentioning in conclusion.
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First, it seems to me that unless Professor Harris wants to revise his 
ethical theory considerably, the ideas he puts forward concerning chil­
dren with disabilities and the voluntary self-extinction of humankind 
ought to be reversed.34 Second, it also seems to me that as Professor 
Harris is right in defending his own child against the claims of others, 
he should grant other parents the right to defend their children as 
well.35
My observations, and the inferences I have drawn from them, can be 
skewed on two accounts. On the one hand, it is perfectly possible that 
I have read the arguments of Wonderwoman and Superman through 
my own theoretical lenses, and distorted them beyond recognition in 
the process. On the other hand, even if the problems that I have un­
earthed are real, Professor Harris may well be able to come up with 
blindingly obvious solutions to them. But be that as it may, I cannot 
help having the feeling that Wonderwoman and Superman, albeit a 
fine achievement, could have been still a notch finer, had the moral 
principles employed in the book been defined explicitly at the outset.
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operate, the extinction must presumably be condemned.
35 As I have argued in the above, liberal utilitarianism would offer a perfect 
solution.
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6. Genetic Engineering and 
the Risk of Harm*
The concept of risk is one of the most important elements in conse- 
quentialist analyses of genetic engineering and biotechnology. The 
term, or its linguistic equivalents, can be found in teleological and 
deontological arguments as well, but the role of the concrete risk of 
harm is less central within these models.1
The paragon of teleological risk-taking is Pascal’s famous wager- 
argument regarding our belief in the existence of God.2 If God exists, 
Pascal argued, and if we fail to believe in Him, we stand to lose eve­
rything, whereas by believing in His existence we stand to gain an af­
terlife of eternal happiness. If, on the other hand, there is no God, we 
can only lose a few earthly pleasures by acting as if there was. Since 
the happiness and misery we encounter if God exists are infinite, it is 
always, no matter how small the probability, in our own best interest 
to place our trust on His beneficient existence rather than on the mea­
gre pleasures of godless hedonism.
The ethos of Pascal’s wager can be easily applied to genetic engi­
neering. We can either believe or disbelieve that all living beings have 
an essence, or nature, which must not, for fear of an unnamed but ab­
solute horror, be tampered with. As our belief in this essence would 
only cost us a few technological advances we can live without, we 
should not risk drawing upon ourselves the ultimate punishment by 
‘playing God’ or by otherwise acting ‘unnaturally’.3
Deontological critics of biotechnology typically argue that the new 
gene-splicing techniques can involve acts which should never be per-
formed, whatever the consequences. For a proponent of this view, the 
dangerous element in genetic engineering is not the probability of con­
crete physical or psychological harm which can ensue from its use, 
but the likelihood that it can lead people into performing acts which 
are categorically forbidden. These acts are in some theories linked 
with the essence of humanity, and in others with the concept of abso­
lute rights or exceptionless duties 4 The underlying idea, however, is 
similar in all deontological and teleological views, namely, that the 
acceptability or unacceptability of taking certain risks depends on the 
intrinsic qualities of the agent’s actions rather than on their actual or 
expected consequences in terms of human well-being, animal welfare, 
or harm .5 It seems to follow from this that it is always the safest pol­
icy to prohibit the implementation of new inventions if there are any 
doubts concerning their moral rightness.6
The four main elements of consequentialist decision-making
When genetic engineering is analysed and assessed in a consequen­
tialist framework, four main elements should be taken into account. 
These elements can be labelled as the benefits, the dampening factors, 
the costs and the risks.
The benefits -  that is, the good things that will probably flow from 
the development and use of biotechnology -  include all the desirable 
contributions that genetic engineers can be expected to make to medi­
cine, pharmacy, agriculture, the food industry, and the preservation of 
our natural environment.7
‘Dampening factors* is a label which can be attached to those pre­
vailing rules, practices and arrangements which tend to counteract the 
benefits of biotechnology either by lowering their quantity or quality,
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or by promoting their unequal distribution. The attitudes and eco­
nomic aims of industrialists can prevent corporations from creating 
products which would maximally promote the well-being of human­
kind, and useful innovations can benefit only or mainly affluent indi­
viduals and nations, leaving the lot of the less well-off unaltered.8
The financial costs of genetic engineering are huge, and unless the 
benefits are even huger, it can be argued that the money should be 
spent in more worthy programmes.
The main risks of biotechnology are connected with the containment 
of genetically altered organisms, with their release to the natural envi­
ronment, and with the untoward social, economic and political conse­
quences of the use of biotechnology.
The first three elements -  the benefits, the dampening factors and 
the costs -  can be assessed without employing the concept of ‘risk’, 
except in the economic sense. The probability of the good outcomes is 
not a risk, because, by definition, risk has to do with undesired results. 
The factors which decrease the probability of the good outcomes are, 
of course, unfortunate, but as long as they are not produced by bio­
technology they cannot be counted among the risks of genetic engi­
neering itself. And costs are not a danger or a risk, they are simply the 
price we have to pay for any attempt to improve the human condition.
Accordingly, if the benefits, even in an analysis which takes dili­
gently into account the dampening factors, outweigh the costs, then 
genetic engineering is, in the light of these considerations, a praise­
worthy enterprise. But what, then, about the dangers, the risks?
The risks involved in biotechnology
Risk can be defined as the possibility or probability of harm -  that is,
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of a loss, an injury, an unwanted outcome or an undesired result. The 
main risks involved in genetic engineering are the following.
The release of genetically altered organisms in the environment can 
increase human suffering (when medical measures are concerned), de­
crease animal welfare (in experiments or through the use of recombi­
nant DNA-techniques in breeding), and lead to ecological disasters. 
The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and in­
dustrial plants involves two layers of risk. The first is the possibility 
of an accidental release in and by itself. Whether or not this will cause 
any further damage, the escape of an altered organism into the envi­
ronment is normally seen as an undesired event. The second layer of 
risk becomes visible in the case of accidental release, and it is the in­
creased probability with which this can produce harm. These are 
matters which have traditionally been dealt with by systematic risk as­
sessment.
A risk that lies between the ‘scientifically controllable’ dangers of 
release and containment, and the more indirect political hazards of 
biotechnology, is the probability of the inadequate handling and irre­
sponsible use of genetically altered material, prompted by the eco­
nomic self-interest of research groups and industrial corporations. The 
difference between this type of risk and the more calculated hazard is 
the following. In the case of balanced decision-making we can rea­
sonably suspect only the intellectual capacities of those who assess the 
possible outcomes. But in the cases of inadequate handling and irre­
sponsible use we can also rationally fear that other types of human 
weakness and immorality are involved.
The purely social and political dangers of genetic engineering in­
clude the possibility of increased economic inequality accompanied by
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an increase in human suffering, and the possibility of large-scale 
eugenic programmes and totalitarian control over human lives. The 
risk in these cases is clearly moral rather than technical. If multina­
tional corporations choose to supersede the national products of Third 
World countries by their own biotechnological substances, millions of 
workers will in a few years’ time be unemployed. And if governments 
decide to develop racial programmes and surveillance systems based 
upon the achievements of genetic engineering, the undesired outcome 
is certain, not possible or probable. The danger is that the decision­
makers act immorally, not that they have miscalculated the conse­
quences of their actions.
In debates concerning the risks of biotechnology the social and po­
litical dangers are not discussed as often as the hazards of responsible 
and irresponsible containment and releases. A partial reason for this 
can be that economic inequality and totalitarian measures are not seen 
by all as unwanted, undesired, or evil. Another partial explanation 
could be that the probability of these outcomes is small, especially in 
the assessment of particular biotechnological innovations or products. 
It is difficult to see a connection between, say, a technological process 
designed to produce inexpensive pharmaceuticals on the one hand and 
the emergence of an unjust, totalitarian political order on the other.
Yet another explanation for the limited scope of the discussion is 
that many people tend to confuse the genuine political risks of bio­
technology with the dampening factors which reduce its beneficial ef­
fects. It can be argued that the harm and injustice which may follow 
the introduction of genetic engineering in a given environment are al­
ways caused by social or psychological factors which have no intrinsic 
connection with the new techniques. If this were the case, then it
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would indeed be futile to debate the political dangers of biotechnology. 
But although there are, no doubt, attitudes and structures which can 
alone bring to the fore the evil aspects of scientific innovations, ge­
netic engineering can also create new types of injustice, and strongly 
contribute to already existent misery. When this occurs, the possibility 
of undesired outcomes should be counted among the risks of biotech­
nology in the proper sense, and discussed as such.
The morality of risk-taking
If risk can be defined as the probability of expected harm, then how 
should we define the concept of ‘acceptable risk’, on which analyses 
of the morality of risk-taking often centre? Is a risk acceptable if the 
probability of harm is on a reasonable level, or should we require that 
the expected harm is also tolerable? The quick answer to this question 
is that the acceptability of a risk is the product of the acceptability of 
the expected harm and the acceptability of its probability. But accept­
ability to whom, and when, and on what criteria?
Industrial corporations have a tendency to treat risks as probable 
costs. This is not always commendable, because some of the harms 
inflicted by the production and marketing of goods cannot be easily 
compensated to those whom the harm befalls. When, for instance, the 
directors and engineers of an American automobile company noticed 
that they had produced a car which exploded in a rear crash if the 
speed was right and the left rear blinker was on, they went on to mar­
ket the model on the ground that the overall economic loss incurred by 
the expected lawsuits would be lower than the price of repairing the 
cars. This decision cost many people their lives and caused others in­
ordinate suffering, and even if the statistics had been correct, which
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they were not, the company’s policy was clearly immoral. At the very 
least, the buyers should have been given the chance to decide for 
themselves whether or not they wanted to take the risk, perhaps by 
purchasing the car at a lower price. Death and suffering caused by 
attempts to make an economic profit are not commensurable with the 
work and capital invested in the enterprise.
The attitudes of individuals towards the acceptability of risk vary, of 
course, considerably. But from the conceptual point of view, it is im­
portant to notice that the decision to take a risk does not turn better or 
worse because of the events that follow the decision. This claim can be 
clarified by two examples.
In the first example, Smith takes a foolish risk by playing Russian 
roulette with the gun pointed at the head of his sleeping friend, Jones. 
When he pulls the trigger, the firing pin hits an empty chamber, no 
bullet is fired, and Jones remains unharmed. She does not even wake 
up. But although no tangible harm was, in the end, inflicted on Jones, 
Smith’s decision was, nonetheless, foolish, because he imposed an un­
acceptable risk of death on her.9
In the second example, Jones knows that with a probability of one to 
ten billion she will blow up Smith’s apartment by turning on her com­
puter (there is something wrong with the wiring). As we all take much 
higher risks every day, let us assume that Jones’s decision to turn on 
her computer today is rational and morally acceptable. Let us further 
assume that today, when Jones turns on the computer, Smith’s apart­
ment is blown up. Now, did Jones take a foolish risk today? Probably 
not. The decision to take the risk was, and still is, in retrospect, ra­
tionally and morally legitimate, despite the unfortunate fact that the 
improbable, unwanted outcome was materialized.10
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How, then, should the acceptability of the risks of genetic engineer­
ing be defined? One good suggestion is that the assessment should in 
each case be left to those who can be harmed by the decision in ques­
tion. Economic risks are acceptable, if they are condoned by the bio­
technological corporations and governments who take them. The risks 
imposed on laboratory personnel by the containment of dangerous 
materials ought to be evaluated by the laboratory personnel them­
selves. All other risks involved in genetic engineering are more or less 
universal, and should therefore be assessed -  and eventually accepted 
or rejected -  as democratically as possible. How, exactly, this should 
be accomplished, must be worked out separately in each social and 
political context.
The examples featuring Smith and Jones annul an objection that can 
be levelled against democratic risk assessment by scientists, industri­
alists and autocratic political decision-makers. The representatives of 
these groups can assert, namely, that their expertise enables them to 
predict with greater accuracy the consequences of policies and actions. 
If the choices are left to democratic processes, the objection continues, 
many good outcomes which would have been perfectly safe fail to 
come into existence, while many undesired results are brought about 
by the prevailing lack of knowledge.
What this objection overlooks is that the acceptability of a risk for a 
given group is not determined exclusively by the facts of the matter, 
but also by the way the members of the group perceive the facts, and 
by the way they evaluate them. People cannot fully commit themselves 
to decisions which are based on epistemic and moral values that they 
do not share. Thus if anything goes wrong with the predictions of the 
experts, people feel entitled and are entitled to resent the consequences
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of the authoritarian choices. The risks taken by experts on behalf of 
others are therefore unacceptable. But if risk-taking is based upon the 
considered choices of those who themselves can be harmed by the con­
sequences, the situation is different. Even if the undesired outcome is 
realized, the risk is acceptable, because it is embedded in their own 
system of ethical and epistemic values.
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7. Biotechnology and the Environment: 
From Moral Objections to Ethical 
Analyses*
In American television series involving lawyers, clashes between their 
moral beliefs and their ethical commitments frequently occur. The 
typical situation is that defence advocates know their clients to be 
guilty of some hideous crimes, but cannot, due to the ethical rules of 
their profession, reveal this to anybody, although they themselves feel 
that their clients ought to be punished for their deeds. The conflict 
arises, because the lawyers know that their ethical standards serve, as 
a rule, the best interest of the members of their societies, but also that 
their moral feelings reflect views which are widely shared in their 
communities. As the solutions to these conflicts are in the series often 
reached through breaches of confidentiality, or by other acts which 
violate the professional code, we, the viewers, are left with the impres­
sion that moral demands should in difficult situations always override 
ethical norms.
This impression is, however, deceptive, if ‘moral demands’ are de­
fined as our unreflected reactions to thorny issues, and ‘ethical norms’ 
as rules or principles which are designed to make human life in ideo­
logically fragmented societies tolerable to everybody. The reason why 
we accept the solutions given in the television courtroom dramas is 
that we regard the guidelines of the legal profession as subordinate to 
better accounts of social ethics, not necessarily that we see the imme­
diate moral responses of individuals or groups as normatively binding.
If the -  admittedly fragile -  conceptual distinction between ‘morals’ 
and ‘ethics’ is applied to the questions of biotechnology and the envi­
ronment, the claim can be made that the majority of popular and 
philosophical responses are, at the moment, founded on the same 
faulty logic as these television series. This is the methodological 
starting point and hypothesis of this paper. Because of the relative ob­
scurity of the distinction between ‘morals’ and ‘ethics’, however, it is 
not employed systematically in the following -  the terms are used 
more or less interchangeably.
Impacts or attitudes?
Many forms of modem biotechnology can have an impact on our 
natural environment. These impacts range from the possibly beneficial 
to the potentially harmful, and they can be felt either by human beings, 
other living beings as individuals, entire species, or by more abstract 
entities like ecosystems or the biodiversity of certain regions or of our 
planet as a whole. Due to these impacts, it would seem reasonable that 
at least critical philosophical responses to questions concerning bio­
technology and the environment would be centred on, or guided by, the 
harms and benefits produced by genetic engineering, and by their 
moral acceptability or unacceptability. But philosophical responses in 
this field are primarily generated by emotional reactions and inappli­
cable ethical theories rather than by any facts regarding the conse­
quences of our actions. This may not be particularly amazing in the 
frameworks of virtue-based and duty-based ethics, but the observation 
seems to be valid even in the context of traditional utilitarian moral 
thinking. The proposal put forward here is that we can render moral 
analyses sensitive to the impacts of genetic engineering on our natural
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environment only by employing a lighter conceptual machinery, which 
takes into account both the consequences of our actions, or what we 
can know about them, and the attitudes we have regarding their ac­
ceptability.
Three traditional approaches to normative ethics
There are three traditional approaches to normative ethics in the West, 
namely the teleological, deontological and consequentialist models. 
These views all provide different answers to two basic questions, 
namely, ‘What is the human nature like?’ and ‘How should individuals 
behave in order to be moral?’
The proponents of the teleological model hold that all beings have a 
telos, or a goal towards which they are inclined to move or to develop. 
The telos can be secular, like in the ethics of Aristotle, who thought 
that the natural goal of human beings is a good life in a just society, 
and beyond that, an elevated state of intellectual contemplation.1 The 
ultimate end can also be defined theologically, in which case the most 
likely candidates include an afterlife of everlasting joy, and some other 
states of being that transcend our earthly experiences.2 Within the 
secular reading of the teleological model individuals should live their 
lives according to the rules of a just society, to be virtuous and to pur­
sue the complicated pleasures of social life and intellectual perfection. 
The theological version can state, in addition, that we should adjust 
our life-styles to the received wisdom handed down to us by our par­
ents and religious authorities.
The basic deontological view of human nature is that our actions 
are guided by two competing motives -  desires and a sense of moral­
ity. This view is open to two main interpretations when it comes to de-
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fining how people should find the guidance they need for their lives. In 
the intellect-based version, reason commands us to obey the moral 
law, usually against our own desires. Immanuel Kant’s theory is the 
paragon of this doctrine.3 The emotion-based reading states that feel­
ings tell us what to do in each particular situation.4
The way proponents of consequentialist thinking see the human 
nature, people want to obtain pleasure, happiness or well-being, and 
they want to avoid pain and suffering. Individuals are equally capable 
of egoism and altruism, that is, of promoting only their own self- 
interest and of taking others into consideration. According to the nor­
mative part of this doctrine, individuals should aim to be universally 
altruistic, either by trying to maximise the happiness of humankind 
(‘positive utilitarianism’) or by trying to minimise suffering (‘negative 
utilitarianism’).5
Virtues and duties
What, then, could be the most typical responses of the different ethical 
doctrines to our present issue?
To begin with the Aristotelian tradition, it is not easy to apply the 
teleological model in its original secular form to the questions of ge­
netic engineering and the natural environment. The link between re­
combinant DNA-techniques and the human good, not to mention the 
good of the planet as a whole, is obscure, and it seems that an accu­
rate view of the consequences of genetics would be required to support 
an adequate analysis of the connection. Otherwise all judgements will 
inevitably be based on the attitudes we already have toward biotech­
nology, and appeals to virtues and the rules of a good society remain 
unsupported by the theory.
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Similar remarks can be extended to Kant’s original views. The fun­
damental duty postulated by him is our obligation to treat humanity in 
ourselves and in other persons always also as ends, never as a mere 
means.6 This obligation, which we owe to our fellow humans but not 
to the members of other species, is based on our nature as rational 
agents. The way we ought to treat animals, plants and other life-forms 
is determined by our duties towards ourselves and other persons, not 
by their (non-existent) worth as ends in themselves.
The difficulties of applying Kant’s views to the manipulation of 
nonhuman beings by recombinant DNA-techniques include the fact 
that he did not clearly specify what our duties as regards animals, 
plants and other nonhuman organisms are. He believed that violence 
and cruelty towards animals set a bad example to our treatment of 
other people, and that not even inanimate objects should be wantonly 
destroyed because that would prevent others from making use of them. 
But how these remarks should be interpreted in the context of genetic 
engineering in a purely non-consequentialist analysis remains an unan­
swered question.
It seems that Aristotle and Kant are in and by themselves unhelpful 
as regards the issues of biotechnology and the environment, because 
the application of their ideas leads us either to ideological choices 
which have nothing to do with their models, or to the consequences of 
our actions which have no legitimate place in them. But traces of more 
theologically-inclined readings of the Aristotelian teaching and of 
Kantian ethics can be found in many popular objections to biotechnol­
ogy, especially in the claims that what genetic engineers do is unnatu­
ral, or an instance of playing God.
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Unnaturalness
The strand of thought in the Aristotelian tradition since Thomas Aqui­
nas which is relevant to the first claim is the reliance on the notion of 
the natural law. The natural law, according to Thomistic thinkers, is 
based on our genuine being and good as persons, and it defines certain 
restrictions to our actions and our ways of life.7 When this doctrine is 
given its secular reading, its main methodological message is that we 
ought to act upon the precepts of reason and oppose our inborn incli­
nation to submit to our passions and desires. Kant’s formulation to the 
same idea was that we should always act in ways which we can accept 
in the light of our practical reason as universal modes of human be­
haviour.8
Depending on the concept of ‘reason’ employed in the formula, it is 
presumably possible to argue within these views that genetic engi­
neering is unnatural, because it is a violation against the unhampered 
order of things in this world, or a practice which we cannot univer­
sally condone. But this argument, if it is an argument somebody would 
seriously wish to put forward, is problematic on two accounts. First, 
its acceptance would imply that all present and future technological 
advances should be banned because they go against reason, or the 
natural order. Secondly, its theoretical tenability requires that we sub­
scribe to the particular definition of reason which forbids us to alter 
the environment in any way. Both demands seem rather excessive.
Playing God
Another line of argument teleological and deontological moralists can 
employ is that the prohibition of genetic engineering stems from the 
fact that there are limits to what we can do as moral agents, and ap-
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plied biologists are overstepping these limits, or ‘playing God’, by 
trying to create new forms of life against the dictates of the natural or 
moral law. This argument has been thoroughly examined by Ruth 
Chadwick.9
According to Chadwick’s analysis, the crux of the argument in the 
context of new technologies is that actions describable as ‘playing 
God’ can lead to disastrous and unpredictable consequences. But 
where should the lines of these actions be drawn and by whom? 
Chadwick considers many possibilities, one of which is particularly 
relevant here. The playing-God objection in the context of new tech­
nologies can, namely, be meant to state that the natural environment 
as a whole sets certain limits to our actions. Humankind has during 
the last few decades acquired powers which could be used to destroy 
most of the biosphere. Many people seem to think that genetic engi­
neering is one of these powers, and they fear that, for instance, the re­
lease of genetically altered organisms into the environment may have 
irreversible ecological consequences.
Assuming that we are interested in the preservation of the biosphere, 
this objection against genetic engineering does indeed have some moral 
relevance. But the problem is that the appeal to consequences, which 
gives this argument its weight, also deprives it of its categorical dis­
guise. It would, no doubt, be pragmatically unwise to destroy the only 
environment where we can live at present, but this does not amount to 
a teleological or deontological rejection of genetic engineering. The 
wrongness of the activity remains conditional upon the consequences.
Disgust
An alternative, emotion-based deontological approach to ethics is pro-
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vided by Patrick Devlin, who in his influential essay ‘Morals and the 
criminal law’ argued that activities should be reproached and banned 
by law if they provoke strong feelings of disgust even in individuals 
who are calm and appreciative of the demands of reason and common 
sense.10 Devlin recognised the fact that feelings can vary from one lo­
cation to another, and confined, accordingly, the prescriptive power of 
any given set of feelings to the community where it is prevalent. He 
also explained the moral force of disgust by maintaining that it indi­
cates the boundaries within which the public morality must remain in 
order to keep the society viable.
Applied to our present case, the Devlinian argument would be that 
biotechnological activities which can have an impact on our natural 
environment ought to be banned, because they would evoke strong 
negative feelings in Western societies and damage their moral founda­
tion. But the difficulty with the emotion-oriented model is that it is ex­
ceedingly relativistic. In most cases there is no consensus concerning 
feelings, and many questions remain unanswered. Whose feelings 
should be respected? Should genetic engineering be banned only if 
everybody feels that it is bad? Or is it sufficient that the majority feel 
that way? Or perhaps prohibitions ought to be employed if a signifi­
cant minority nurtures these feelings? Or should we say that if any­
body feels this way, biotechnology ought to be rejected? Furthermore, 
the question also remains as to how the damage to the moral founda­
tion of societies can be verified. There seem to be no good responses 




As we noted at the outset of this paper, it is not all that surprising that 
the responses of teleological and deontological moralists rely either on 
ethical presuppositions which ignore the impacts of biotechnology on 
the environment, or on ill-defined considerations of the consequences 
of our actions. What is more amazing, however, is that the situation is 
similar as regards standard utilitarian models of moral thinking, which 
should be centred on the advantages and disadvantages of the prac­
tices we accept or reject. This is because there are two stories which 
can be told about these, and the choice between them has very little to 
do with the actual or expected consequences of our actions.11
The advantages of genetic engineering, as seen by its proponents, 
include many actual and potential contributions to medicine, phar­
macy, agriculture, the food industry, and the preservation of our natu­
ral environment. The applications of genetic engineering to agriculture 
include the development of plants which contain their own pesticides. 
As for other food products, gene technologies can be applied to manu­
facture substances like vanilla, cocoa, coconut oil, palm oil and sugar 
substitutes. And biotechnology can even provide an answer to the 
problems of pollution, as genetically engineered bacteria can be em­
ployed to neutralise toxic chemicals and other kinds of industrial and 
urban waste.
The disadvantages of biotechnology, as seen by its opponents, are in 
many cases closely connected with the alleged benefits. One problem 
is that, despite the undoubtedly good intentions of the scientists, the 
actual applications of genetic engineering are often positively danger­
ous. Consider the case of plants which are inherently resistant to dis-
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eases, or which contain their own pesticides. Although there are no 
theoretical obstacles to the production of such highly desirable enti­
ties, corporations -  who also sell chemical pesticides -  might prefer to 
market another type of genetically manipulated plant, which is unpro­
tected against pests but highly tolerant to toxic chemicals. The result 
of this policy would be an increase in the use of dangerous chemicals 
in agriculture, particularly in the Third World -  which is to say that 
the outcome is exactly opposite to the one predicted by the proponents 
of biotechnology.
An oft-used criticism against agricultural biotechnology is that the 
introduction of altered organisms into the natural environment can 
lead to ecological catastrophes. Scientists working in the field of ap­
plied biology have themselves noticed this danger, and set for them­
selves ethical guidelines which are designed, among other things, to 
minimise this risk. But as the opponents of genetic engineering have 
repeatedly pointed out, not all research teams follow ethical guidelines 
if  the alternative is considerable financial profit.
Thus, although the expected advantages and dreaded disadvantages 
of genetic engineering are fairly well publicised, it is difficult to assess 
objectively what the actual consequences of employing the techniques 
would be. The results of assessments depend more on the optimism 
and pessimism of those evaluating the situation than on the conse­
quences themselves.
Risk
A possible way out of these dilemmas is, we suggest, to concentrate 
only on the negative consequences of genetic engineering, or risks, as 
people perceive them in the light of the facts available to us.
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‘Risk’ can be defined as the possibility or probability of a loss, an 
injury, an unwanted outcome or an undesired result. Some of the po­
tential harms involved in genetic engineering are the following. The 
release of genetically altered organisms in the environment can in­
crease human suffering when medical measures are concerned, de­
crease animal welfare in experiments or through the use of recombi­
nant DNA-techniques in breeding, and lead to ecological disasters. 
The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and in­
dustrial plants involves two dangers: first is the possibility of an acci­
dental release and second is the increased probability with which un­
controlled releases can produce undesired results. A risk that lies be­
tween these ‘scientifically controllable’ dangers and the more indirect 
political hazards of biotechnology is the probability of inadequate 
containment and irresponsible releases, which can be prompted by the 
economic self-interest of research groups and industrial corporations.
Given that ‘risk’ can be defined as the probability of harm, then how 
should we define the concept of ‘acceptable risk’, on which analyses 
of the morality of risk-taking often centre? Our own view is that the 
assessment should in each case be left to those who can be harmed by 
the decision in question. Economic risks are acceptable, if they are 
condoned by the biotechnological corporations and governments who 
take them. The risks imposed on laboratory personnel by the contain­
ment of dangerous materials ought to be evaluated by the laboratory 
personnel themselves. All other risks involved in genetic engineering 
are more or less universal, and should therefore be assessed -  and 
eventually accepted or rejected -  as democratically as possible.12
Scientists, industrialists and autocratic political decision-makers can 
argue against democratic risk assessment by claiming that their ex-
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pertise enables them to predict with greater accuracy the consequences 
of different policies. What this objection overlooks, however, is that 
the acceptability of a risk for a given group is not determined exclu­
sively by the facts of the matter, but also by the way the members of 
the group perceive the facts, and by the way they evaluate them. Peo­
ple cannot fully commit themselves to decisions which are based on 
epistemic and moral values that they do not share. If anything goes 
wrong with the predictions of the experts, people feel, and are, entitled 
to resent the consequences of the authoritarian choices. The risks 
taken by experts on behalf of others are therefore unacceptable. But if 
risk-taking is based upon the considered choices of those who can be 
harmed by the consequences themselves, the situation is different. 
Even if the undesired outcome is realised, the risk is acceptable, be­
cause it is embedded in their own system of ethical and epistemic val­
ues.
Rights
In conclusion, let us add a few words on rights. Rights can in ethical 
analyses be founded on any of the systems we have discussed in this 
paper -  on the natural law, on the duties postulated by deontological 
ethics, and on the consequences of our actions. The concept of risk we 
have outlined supports a theory of rights which provides at least indi­
vidual human beings with the entitlement not to be harmed by the en­
vironmental impacts of biotechnology. The analysis can, we believe, 
also be extended to the rights of animals and possibly ecosystems, 
who can be harmed by our actions as well as human beings. The fur­
ther examination of these harms and rights would probably be the best 
way to proceed from emotional moral objections to truly ethical analy-
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ses in the context of biotechnology and the environment.
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8. Commercial Genetic Testing and the 
Right to Know*
Ethicists and consumer groups have suggested that the direct access of 
individuals to commercial genetic tests should be restricted and regu­
lated. In this paper it is examined how such restrictions could be de­
fended. The intermediary conclusion is that the reasons given for many 
suggested regulations are good, but they all miss an important point, 
namely the question, ‘What if individuals have a right to know about 
their genetic makeup?’ This question calls forth comparisons with 
other practices which are not subject to constraints, although their aim 
and features are similar to the aim and features of genetic testing. Dif­
ferent conceptions of autonomy and different views regarding the re­
sponsibility of the scientific community offer partial explanations to 
disagreements concerning the proper limits of genetic testing. But in 
the end, we are left with the question, ‘What is so special about ge­
netic information?’
Ann, Bob, Carol, David and Emma
Consider the following examples.
Ann is preparing to work abroad for five years. For reasons best 
known to herself, she believes that she may have contracted the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Ann has no confidence 
in the health services of her destination, and she wants to be 
tested for her HIV status at home. The result of the test will 
probably influence her future decisions in many ways.
Bob is planning on taking on a new job as the sparring partner 
for Mike Tyson. For reasons best known to himself, he believes 
that he may have suffered some injuries to the head, which 
would render him vulnerable to permanent brain damage in his 
prospective job. He wants to be examined by a physician. The re­
sult of the examination will probably influence his future deci­
sions in many ways.
Carol believes, for reasons best known to herself, that she is 
pregnant. She wants to verify the belief by using a pregnancy test 
kit. The result of the test will probably influence her future deci­
sions in many ways.
David’s wife, who happens to be the President of the United 
States, is preparing herself for an important international meet­
ing concerning world peace. David, for reasons best known to 
himself, believes that the position of the stars and the planets is 
not right for such a meeting. He wants to find out if this is so by 
consulting an astrologer. David has considerable influence on 
the decisions of the President, and the astrologer’s reading will 
probably have an impact on the lives of numerous people.
Emma suspects, for reasons best known to herself, that she is at 
increased inherited risk to develop breast cancer. She wants to 
find out if this is the case by consulting a commercial company 
which markets genetic tests for her possible condition. The result 
of the test will probably influence her future decisions in many 
ways.
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These cases have many similarities, but there is at least one striking 
difference. While nobody seems to deny that Ann, Bob, Carol and 
David should be free to purchase the information they want, there are 
those who say that Emma’s choice is subject to legitimate restrictions. 
Let us see what the reasons for this view could be.
The commercialisation of genetic tests -  good and bad
Genetic testing has contributed to the improvement of diagnoses, 
prognoses and the treatment of genetically-based diseases, and pro­
vided individuals with an opportunity to find out about the risks that 
their inheritance poses on their health. The commercialisation of ge­
netic testing can make the tests accessible to larger groups of people. 
Without economic incentives private enterprises cannot afford to de­
velop tests and offer them to the public. Commercial genetic testing 
can increase human well-being, reduce suffering, and enhance individ­
ual freedom and autonomy. In addition, the production and marketing 
of genetic tests either through health care providers or directly to the 
consumers generate profits and create employment. These are good 
reasons for allowing the free production and distribution of genetic 
services to their ultimate consumers, that is, the members of the gen­
eral public. Within liberal democratic societies there are also strong 
political grounds for market freedom.
Despite these potential benefits, however, some philosophers have 
argued that commercial genetic testing ought to be regulated, or even 
partly prohibited. For instance, Rogeer Hoedemaekers and Henk ten 
Have have recently argued that the commercialisation of genetic diag­
nostic services involves dangers and raises ethical questions which 
make it necessary to limit the availability of such services.1 They em-
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ploy concepts like ‘reasonable risk’ and ‘fair dealing’, and conclude 
that genetic tests, including predictive genetic tests like the breast can­
cer test, should be offered only through health professionals, and only 
after the information provided by the producers of the tests have been 
reviewed by an overseeing body which is independent from commer­
cial interests.
As regards the free, unmediated predictive testing of apparently 
healthy persons, which is the focus of this paper, the suggested re­
strictions have been based on three major observations. The unre­
stricted marketing of predictive genetic tests can be, it has been sug­
gested, harmful, manipulative and a source of inequality. Similar 
constraints can be proposed, for similar reasons, on genetic tests 
which are not directly marketable to the consumers. The focus here is 
on commercial testing, because this is the area where the pressure for 
regulation is at its most intensive.
Harm
What harm can commercial genetic testing inflict and on whom? Sev­
eral groups have been identified by Hoedemaekers and ten Have as 
possible recipients of physical or mental harm or economic damage.
Those tested can feel uncertainty and anguish, for various reasons. 
The interpretation of the test results is often difficult -  the tested indi­
viduals themselves do not know what to make of them; medical pro­
fessionals are not always knowledgeable enough to help them ade­
quately; and some tests yield results which are, in and by themselves, 
so ambiguous that no easy decisions can be based on them. And even 
if the reading of the result is clear -  perhaps especially then -  indi­
viduals can be anguished by the knowledge of an adverse genetic con-
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dition, and by the choices they are forced to make because of that 
knowledge.
The relatives of those tested can also be harmed by the information, 
if the condition in question is hereditary. Their privacy can be violated 
by the tested individuals or by health professionals, who see it as their 
right or duty to inform them -  and thereby make them share the un­
certainty and anguish. Even if they are not told, their right not to know 
about their own condition is violated by the fact that they see their 
relatives undergo treatments or life-style changes which can only be 
taken as indications of hereditary diseases.2
Moving to another area, the sphere of business, private insurance 
companies, and subsequently their other policyholders, can be eco­
nomically harmed, if those tested positive for fatal diseases conceal 
this information when taking a policy.
Finally, on a very general level, anybody and everybody can be 
harmed by the free commercial marketing of genetic tests: there will 
be increased social pressures towards testing oneself for a variety of 
conditions, and towards changes in one’s life-style.
Manipulation
Even if nobody is directly harmed, physically or mentally, by the 
commercialisation of genetic testing, there are wider social concerns. 
One of them is that the test offers made by private enterprises may be 
manipulative and play on the anxieties of the general public. This may 




Another wider social concern is that commercial genetic tests can be 
expensive, especially if they are accompanied by extensive counseling. 
This means that genetic tests will be more readily available to those 
who have the money to pay for them, and this can be seen as an in­
stance of inequality and injustice.
It must be added, though, that the nature of the injustice here is un­
clear, with all the harm and anguish that can be caused by genetic 
testing. Or, to put it crudely, if the rich want to be tested, why not let 
them suffer the consequences of their privilege?
Countermeasures
What, then, can be done to reduce the harm caused by commercial ge­
netic testing, and to remove the elements of manipulation and inequal­
ity from it? The following solutions have been suggested:1 23
1. That the quality o f genetic tests offered commercially be 
controlled by an independent, possibly governmental, body.
This would reduce the unnecessary anxieties and uncertainties 
created by false test results.
2. That the promotional material o f the testing companies and 
laboratories be checked and revised by an independent su­
pervising body.
This would prevent the manipulation of the decisions of indi­
viduals by evoking fears and anxieties through the use of false, 
exaggerated or one-sided images.
3. That the conveyance o f the test results be accompanied by 
adequate counseling.
This would reduce unnecessary fears and uncertainties, and
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check the harm inflicted on others by the knowledge.
4. That some more complicated or controversial tests be 
available only through health professionals.
This would be a way to prevent, for instance, prenatal testing 
where this is not aimed at promoting the health of the unborn 
child. The constraint could also reduce unnecessary anxieties, 
depending on the counseling skills of health providers.
5. That some tests be restricted to the public health services.
This would remove the injustice of unequal access to some rarely 
needed testing services which could only be obtained by those 
who can afford them.
6. That some tests be banned altogether.
This could be limited to the prenatal testing of the non-health- 
related features and qualities of future children -  sex, expected 
beauty or intelligence, and so on. The desired outcome would 
presumably be the prevention of abortions.
All these regulations can, arguably, be defended by appeals to the pre­
vention of harm, manipulation and inequality.
Public reasons, private choices
Let us return, at this point, to the example where Emma wants to be 
commercially tested for inherited susceptibility for breast cancer. 
What do all these regulations mean in her case?
Since the relevant genetic test can only predict that it is or is not 
probable, given an array o f  other factors, that Emma will develop 
breast cancer, almost all the regulations listed in the above can be ap­
plied here.4 False -  and poorly interpreted -  test results are a definite 
risk in susceptibility testing for breast cancer, and it would clearly be
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reasonable, according to the cited criteria, that the quality of the tests 
be somehow publicly controlled. Emma’s decision to seek the infor­
mation can well stem from fear and anxiety, and if the unchecked 
promotional material of the testing laboratories has influenced her 
choice, this is not, in terms of considered decision making, a good 
thing. The information she is seeking is ambiguous and uncertain, and 
it can therefore be required that the conveyance of the test results 
should be accompanied by extensive counseling. It is by no means im­
possible that the result of the test can prompt Emma not to have chil­
dren, or to terminate her pregnancy, if she is pregnant, so that the pro­
posed conditions for the involvement of health professionals are met. 
The genetic tests for breast cancer susceptibility are relatively expen­
sive -  from hundreds to thousands of US dollars -  and the injustice 
resulting from unequal access to them can perhaps be removed only 
by confining them to the public health services. And if the information 
can prompt Emma to choose an abortion -  perhaps because the test 
result changes her life plans -  the protection of unborn human life 
provides grounds for banning the test altogether.
But the problem here is that from Emma’s own viewpoint she only 
wants to know something about herself. The reasons given for the 
regulations are public and wide-ranging, while Emma’s wish to obtain 
the information is private and concerns primarily herself. And many of 
us believe that individuals have a right to know what happens in their 
bodies and in their environment, even if this is not always 4 for the 
common good’. In most cases, moreover, this right is also recognised 
by the public authorities.
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The right to know in nongenetic matters
Let us reconsider examples A to D, presented to throw light on 
Emma’s predicament. Ann would like to be tested for her HTV status. 
Bob wants to get his head examined. Carol wishes to buy a pregnancy 
test kit. David wants an astrologer to tell him if the position of the ce­
lestial bodies is favourable to international peace negotiations.
In all these cases, many of the features which made genetic testing 
for breast cancer susceptibility subject to restrictions are present. In 
each example, a person wants to know something that will affect her 
or his future. The information received in most of them is uncertain 
and open to many interpretations. The information, once acquired, can 
lead to actions which affect the persons themselves and others -  in 
some cases lethally. The actions induced by the information are not 
always undertaken in a fully autonomous manner. Some of the meth­
ods of acquiring information are expensive, so that the information 
and the potential benefits flowing from the knowledge are only avail­
able to those who can afford them.
Despite these similarities, nobody prevents Ann, Bob, Carol and 
David from seeking the information they want, provided that they 
know where to find it and have the financial means to achieve it. It is 
true, of course, that some of the methods of acquiring information are 
controlled in some ways. There are quality controls for HTV tests and 
pregnancy kits, and medical examinations can be properly performed 
only by qualified physicians. But nobody has suggested that Ann, Bob 
or Carol should be prevented from knowing what they want to know. 
And in David’s case there are virtually no controls. So why single out 
Emma? What is it in genetic information that would justify the extra 
regulations?
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Is genetic information special?
The idea that genetic information is somehow special has been re­
cently criticised by Soren Holm,5 Joseph S. Alper and Jon Beckwith,6 
and Veikko Launis.7 They have identified four aspects which could 
distinguish genetic from nongenetic information but which do not, in 
closer examination, do this -  at least not in any normatively binding 
sense. These aspects are predictiveness, transmissibility, informa­
tiveness regarding other individuals and personal sensitivity .8
It can be argued that genetic information is predictive, or more accu­
rately predictive than other types of information. But the response to 
this is that Ann’s HIV test result, Bob’s head examination and Carol’s 
pregnancy test also predict certain physical changes in them. Carol’s 
case is slightly problematic in this respect, because the test result indi­
cates, or diagnoses, rather than only predicts her condition.9 She is 
pregnant or she is not. The same remark seems to apply to Ann, as her 
test reveals whether or not she is HIV positive -  and in this sense indi­
cates her condition. But the significant information in this case is 
clearly predictive, namely that without proper medication she is likely 
to develop the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS. And 
Bob’s situation is even more straightforward. His examination can 
undeniably reveal future tendencies which, if combined with the right 
environmental factors, can lead -  or fail to lead -  to physical injuries. 
As for accuracy, there are two things to be said in our present context. 
Genetic tests for breast cancer susceptibility are not accurate. And if 
they were, many of the ethical problems referred to by Hoedemaekers 
and ten Have would be solved, because they arise from the /«accuracy 
of the information.
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It has also been pointed out that genetic tests often tell individuals 
about features or conditions which can be transmitted to their off­
spring. This remark is perfectly true in the case of breast cancer sus­
ceptibility detection, but it can also be extended, for instance, to HIV 
testing. And, as noted by Holm, social characteristics like class and 
level of education are also transmissible in the sense that more often 
than not children belong to the same social class as their parents, and 
acquire roughly similar levels of education.
What, then, about the fact that genetic tests can provide information 
about other people, especially about the family members of those 
tested? Well, it is a fact, but not a fact specific to genetic testing. 
Ann’s HTV status can also tell something about her husband, to whom 
she has been sexually faithful all through their long marriage. And it 
can give information regarding the HTV status of Ann’s baby, whom 
she has breast-fed until recently. Carol’s pregnancy test, too, gives in­
formation concerning the fertility of her only sex partner in years, and 
so on.
The final attempt to draw the distinction is to assert that genetic in­
formation is particularly sensitive, or more profoundly personal than 
other types of knowledge, because it describes the deepest, immutable 
level of human biology.10
It is not necessary here to analyse in detail the sensitivity of various 
types of information, or the immutable depths of the human constitu­
tion.11 This is because the distinction, if it exists, can, at least argua­
bly, only strengthen Emma’s claim to the information she wants. If the 
knowledge concerning her susceptibility to breast cancer is deeply and 
immutably a constitutive part of her person, then who could justifiably 
deny her access to it? Yes, there is the risk that other people can learn
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about her condition through, for instance, the indiscretion of the test­
ing laboratory. And assuming that the information is sensitive, this 
can be a problem. But not necessarily. Should she develop breast can­
cer at some point in her life, others would be likely to find out in any 
case. And what if Emma wants to know, anyway? What if she says, ‘I 
don’t care how many other people will know about this -  the only 
thing that matters to me is that 1 have access to this profoundly per­
sonal, sensitive and self-constitutive knowledge.’
A ccu ra te  knowledge as a right
‘Access to what’, however, is the next question the defenders of the 
restrictions are likely to ask. A possible justification for the suggested 
regulations is, namely, that consumers have a right to accurate infor­
mation in genetic matters, and this right cannot be protected without 
proper constraints. But this is a tricky argument to use.
The ‘right to know’ normally implies that the information individu­
als want must not be withheld from them. This right is perfectly com­
patible with market freedom in cases like Ann, Carol and Emma’s. If 
they want accurate knowledge, they can consult a physician or a ge­
netic counsellor, or take whatever additional steps they see fit. But if 
they have decided to settle for less precise guidance, they should also 
be free to order a test kit by mail.
There are two ways to take the restrictive argument further than 
this. The first is to say that autonomous individuals have a right to ac­
curate information even if they do not themselves want it. This ap­
proach turns the right to know into a duty to know. The second option 
is to claim that people’s healthy desire to acquire information has been 
dulled by their general confidence in medicine, and that medical pro-
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fessionals therefore have a special duty to protect them in this matter.
Autonomy as a duty
According to the first line of argument, it would be immoral to de­
mand unregulated predictive testing opportunities, because consumers 
have a duty to make fully autonomous decisions and this is not possi­
ble in the light of ambiguous information. People must know the rami­
fications of their actions in order to make the right choices.
The force of this argument depends on the notion of autonomy one 
holds.12 In the ethics of theorists like Immanuel Kant, we do indeed 
have an obligation to be autonomous, and to act in accordance with 
the best information we can obtain.13 But the Kantian model has been 
challenged by another school of thought, exemplified by John Stuart 
Mill, which maintains that we are allowed to make uninformed and 
even self-destructive choices as long as we do not significantly harm 
others by doing so.14 The question is, which doctrine should we em­
ploy to tackle the problem of commercial genetic testing?
A brief argument for the Millian alternative can be based on the dis­
tinction between individual and social ethics. Kant’s philosophy deals 
primarily with the morality of individuals as atomistic, self-sufficient 
agents, whereas Mill’s view centres on the legitimacy of the social 
regulation of people’s lives. Since commerce is essentially a social 
enterprise, it would seem reasonable to analyse it in terms of the Mil­
lian rather than the Kantian concept of autonomy. This is not to say 
that Kant’s ideas should be dismissed altogether. If individuals make 
foolish decisions because they have intentionally acquired potentially 
misleading information, their decisions can be criticised in terms of 
‘Kantian’ autonomy. But this criticism ought to be limited to ‘remon-
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strating’, ‘reasoning’, ‘persuading’ and ‘entreating’, to use Mill’s 
original language.15 Individuals must not be coerced or compelled to 
behave rationally in matters which concern mainly or only themselves. 
In the present context, this means that people can be morally criticised 
by others for purchasing genetic information which it is, nevertheless, 
their legal right to purchase.
On the other hand, the Kantian concept of autonomy can also be 
employed to support the freedom of commercial genetic testing. If  in­
dividuals have a duty to make their own decisions, then they must not 
be legally forced into acting in accordance with the opinions of others, 
whatever their medical or scientific expertise may be. Rational, 
autonomous individuals can have a moral duty to seek the best possi­
ble information concerning their health status. But they must decide 
for themselves where and how to find this information, otherwise they 
would be acting ‘heteronomously’ -  following somebody else’s law.
The responsibility of the medical profession
According to the second line of argument, however, the social nature 
of commercial genetics implies that the medical profession has a spe­
cial duty to protect people from incomplete information which can 
play on their health-related anxieties. This duty does not extend to the 
field of, say, horoscopes, because physicians and biologists are not 
responsible for the beliefs and ideologies which lie behind this prac­
tice. But it does extend, so the argument goes, to predictive genetic 
testing, since the expectations of the general public concerning the 
beneficial effects of genetic knowledge are, to a fair degree, created by 
scientists and medical professionals. The crux of the argument is that 
physicians and genetic counsellors must safeguard their clientele
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against false hopes and fears, for which they themselves are partly re­
sponsible.
It must be noted that this line of reasoning has not been clearly ex­
plicated in the discussion, although traces of it can be detected in both 
academic and public debates. The idea of professional responsibility 
helps to clarify, however, two norms which pertain to predictive ge­
netic testing. If physicians and molecular biologists can be held re­
sponsible for building up the expectations of others with regard to the 
value of genetic information, then they can justifiably feel that they 
should warn others against the risks of unregulated commercial test­
ing. This is a Kantian duty they are entitled to assume as long as they 
do not coerce or compel others to conform with their own views. But 
as feelings of responsibility, however deeply felt, do not justify any 
restrictions on other people’s lives, medical professionals have no 
right to dictate policies which would curtail the freedom of choice of 
their clientele.
No grounds for extensive regulation?
What conclusions can be drawn from these observations? To what 
extent should Emma’s decision be subject to public regulations?
If the current respect for people’s right to nongenetic information is 
well-founded and well-proportioned, then the cases of Ami, Bob, 
Carol and David can offer some guidance. Perhaps the laboratories 
which offer genetic tests for breast cancer susceptibility should be 
controlled for the quality of their products like the laboratories which 
offer HTV tests and the companies which manufacture pregnancy test 
kits. And perhaps none of these should advertise their products in 
misleading ways.
1 1 7
But even these regulations are not extended to David’s choice. As­
trologers are allowed to market their services in whichever way they 
wish, and there are no quality controls in their work. This is puzzling 
in view of the fact that their predictions are even more ambiguous and 
more open to interpretations than genetic test results. Should it be in­
ferred from this that even quality control and marketing regulation are 
excessive and illegitimate hindrances on acquiring information in 
modem Western societies?16 Or should astrologers be required to 
submit their methods and predictions to an independent review board 
for inspection?
In the cases of Ann and Bob it seems reasonable to demand that the 
health profession should somehow be involved in the process of con­
veying the medical knowledge to the ones seeking it. Counseling helps 
them to understand the implications of the information, reduces unnec­
essary anxieties and prevents people from jumping to hasty conclu­
sions. But in many countries pregnancy test kits can be purchased 
without any intervention from physicians, nurses or social workers. 
Even if Carol’s life, and the lives of other people, can be profoundly 
influenced by the result of the test, she is not required to seek coun­
seling or medical assistance. Why should Emma’s predicament be in­
terpreted differently?
The only conclusion here can be that not many regulations seem 
justifiable in the context of genetic testing. The foregoing discussion 
may, of course, have missed some obvious differences between the 
cases of Ann, Bob, Carol, David and Emma. But until somebody ex­
plains what these differences are, and why they make a moral or legal 
difference, there are no good grounds for the heavy regulations pro­
posed for commercially acquiring genetic information.
1 1 8
Notes
This paper was originally prepared for the European-Commission funded 
project Euroscreen 2 -  Genetic Screening and Testing: Towards commu­
nity policy on insurance, commercialisation and promoting public aware­
ness, Cowbridge, Wales, 23-25 October 1998. My thanks are due to the co­
ordinator of the project, Professor Ruth Chadwick.
A slightly advanced version was presented in the Fourth World Congress 
of Bioethics, Tokyo, Japan, 4-7 November 1998.
The paper was completed with Tuija Takala, to whom I extend my thanks 
for the permission to publish it here. Our thanks are also due to all those 
who have criticised our ideas in conferences and in correspondence for 
forcing us to see clearer many dimensions of the genetic information dis­
cussion. All the remaining mistakes are due to our own stubbornness, not 
their lack of effort.
1 R. Hoedemaekers and H. ten Have, ‘Commercialisation of genetic diag­
nostic services’, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 (1998): 217-224. 
Despite the title, the article discusses predictive as well as purely diagnostic 
genetic tests.
2 On the legitimate uses of this argument, see T. Takala, ‘The right to ge­
netic ignorance confirmed’, Bioethics 13 (1999): 288-293.
3 The following list contains mainly regulations proposed by Hoedemaekers 
and ten Have. But others have supported similar caution -  see, e g., Ge­
netic Screening and Testing: toward Community policy on insurance, 
commercialisation and promoting public awareness (EUROSCREEN 2) 
Final Report, Preston: Centre for Professional Ethics, 1999.
1 1 9
4 See, e.g., NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal and Social Impli­
cations of Human Genome Research, Genetic Information and Health In­
surance: Report o f the Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance, 
Bethesda, Maryland: US Department of Health and Human Services, 1993; 
National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research, ‘Statement on 
use of DNA testing for presymptomatic identification of cancer risk’, Jour­
nal o f the American Medical Association 271 (1994): 785; National Breast 
Cancer Coalition, Presymptomatic genetic testing for heritable breast can­
cer risk, Washington DC, 1995; American Society of Clinical Oncology, 
‘Statement of the American Society of Clinical Oncology: Genetic testing 
for cancer susceptibility’ Journal o f Clinical Oncology 14 (1996): 1730- 
1736; G. Geller, J.R. Botkin, M.J. Green et al., ‘Genetic testing for suscep­
tibility to adult-onset cancer: The process and content of informed consent’, 
Journal o f the American Medical Association 111 (1997): 1467-1474.
5 S. Holm, ‘There is nothing special about genetic information’, in: A.K. 
Thompson and R.F. Chadwick (eds), Genetic Information: Acquisition, 
Access, and Control, New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London and Moscow: 
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999: 97-103.
6 J.S. Alper and J. Beckwith, ‘Distinguishing genetic from non-genetic 
medical tests: Some implications for antidiscrimination legislation’, Sci­
ence and Engineering Ethics 4 (1998): 141-150.
7 V. Launis, ‘The use of genetic test information in insurance: The argu­
ment from indistinguishability reconsidered’, Science and Engineering 
Ethics 6 (2000), forthcoming.
8 Holm discusses all four aspects, while Alper, Beckwith and Launis do not 
comment on transmissibility. In what follows, the ideas presented by Holm 
(1999, 98-100) are employed, if not otherwise indicated.
9 Critics who have read earlier drafts of this paper have argued that since 
pregnancy tests are used when symptoms are visible, they are diagnostic
120
rather than predictive. But this is not necessarily a good argument. The 
‘symptoms’ which motivate the purchase of the kit are often vague and 
ambiguous. Delayed menstruation, probably the reason for commercial 
home-made testing, is not a reliable sign of pregnancy, and neither are 
sickness, family history or personal conviction. The relevant point here is 
that these signs do not differ drastically from the hints that drive people 
into genetically testing themselves. The distinction between ‘predictive’ 
and ‘diagnostic’ tests is not clear-cut.
10 ‘Sensitivity’ and ‘descriptive of the deepest biological level’ are expres­
sions used by Holm, ‘more profoundly personal’ and ‘immutable’ are at­
tributes discussed by Launis. The drift of their arguments is, however, the 
same.
11 Both Holm and Launis do a good job of showing that these features are 
not normatively relevant in discussions regarding genetic information.
12 On genetics and autonomy, see, e.g., R. Rhodes, ‘Genetic links, family 
ties and social bonds: rights and responsibilities in the face of genetic 
knowledge’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 (1998): 10-30; T. Ta­
kala and M. Häyry, ‘Genetic ignorance, moral obligations and social du­
ties’, Journal o f Medicine and Philosophy 25 (2000): 107-113.
13 See, e.g., I. Kant, Ethical Philosophy (translated by James W. Ellington; 
Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, second edition 
1994).
14 See, e.g., J.S. Mill, On Liberty and the Subjection o f Women (Ware: 
Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996).
15 Mill 1996, 13.
16 Academics who have read or heard earlier drafts of this paper have ar­
gued that the analogy between genetic tests and personal horoscopes is 
flippant and inappropriate. For one thing, people do not, they have as­
serted, take the predictions made by astrologers as seriously as they take the
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9. Genetic Ignorance, Moral Obligations 
and Social Duties*
In a contribution to The Journal o f  Medicine and Philosophy Profes­
sor Rosamond Rhodes argues that individuals sometimes have an ob­
ligation to know about their genetic disorders, because this is required 
by their status as autonomous persons. In this comment, her analysis, 
which is based on Kant’s concept of autonomy and Aristotle’s notion 
of friendship, is extended to consequentalist concerns. These are of 
paramount importance if, as Professor Rhodes herself implies, the 
Kantian and Aristotelian doctrines can be helpful only in the sphere of 
private morality, not in the public realm. Better tools for assessing the 
right to genetic ignorance as an issue of public policy can, it is con­
tended here, be found in Mill’s ideas concerning liberty and the pre­
vention of harm. The conclusion, based on the Millian way of think­
ing, is that individuals probably do have the right to remain in igno­
rance in the cases Professor Rhodes presents as examples of a duty to 
know.
Introduction
In the ethical literature concerning genetic information it has become 
customary to maintain or at least to imply that under certain circum­
stances individuals have a duty to know about hereditary disorders in 
their constitution, and that they do not always have the right not to 
know that their genes are in some respect less than perfect. Few phi­
losophers have, however, taken the time and mustered the energy to
defend this position with any cogency. It was, therefore, a pleasant 
surprise to find that Rosamond Rhodes has taken on this task in her 
intriguing article ‘Genetic links, family ties and social bonds: rights 
and responsibilities in the face of genetic knowledge,’ which was re­
cently published in the Journal o f  Medicine and Philosophy}
Two concepts of autonomy
Professor Rhodes argues that individuals do not have a moral right not 
to know about their own genetic disorders, because without all the 
relevant information they cannot make autonomous choices, which, 
however, are the hallmark of morality. If decisions are made without 
adequate knowledge, our actions are guided by mere chance, and this 
is not sufficient to warrant their true freedom. She writes:
Now, if autonomy is the ground for my right to determine my 
own course, it cannot also be the ground for not determining my 
own course. If autonomy justifies my right to knowledge, it can­
not also justify my refusing to be informed. [...] From a Kantian 
perspective, autonomy is the essence of what morality requires of 
me. The core content of my duty is self-determination. To say 
this in another way, I need to appreciate that my ethical obliga­
tion is to rule myself, that is, to be a just ruler over my own ac­
tions. As sovereign over myself I am obligated to make 
thoughtful and informed decisions without being swayed by ir­
rational emotions, including my fear of knowing significant ge­
netic facts about myself.2
From this Professor Rhodes concludes that individuals are ethically 
required to be informed about their genetic disorders whenever it can
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be judged that reasonable persons would want to know about them.
There are, however, serious limitations to the argument presented. 
While Professor Rhodes’s sense of moral duty is admirable, and her 
presentation of the Kantian view coherent and persuasive, there is an 
alternative reading of the concept of autonomy which yields com­
pletely different normative conclusions as regards the right to remain 
in ignorance. The following passage is composed by superimposing 
Professor Rhodes’s text by Millian additions, which retain the intui­
tive acceptability of the message, but change the emphasis considera­
bly:
Now, if autonomy is the ground for my right to determine my 
own course i f  and when I  so wish, it can also be the ground for 
not determining my own course i f  and when I so wish. If auton­
omy justifies my right to knowledge when 1 want to know, it can 
also justify my refusing to be informed when 1 do not want to 
know. [...] From a Millian perspective, autonomy is the essence 
of what morality requires others to respect in their dealings with 
me. The core content of the duty o f others towards me is respect 
for my self-determination. To say this in another way, they need 
to appreciate that their ethical obligation is to let me rule myself 
i f  and when and to the degree that 1 so wish, that is, to let me be 
a just ruler over my own actions. As sovereign over myself I am 
entitled to make my own decisions without being coerced by the 
opinions of others.3
The conclusion to be drawn from this revised passage is that individu­
als are, after all, entitled to ignorance in genetic matters, if this is what
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they themselves want.
Kant, Aristotle, and the moral obligation to know
In all fairness to Professor Rhodes’s position, it must be noted that her 
focus in the article is not how others should respond to our preference 
to remain in ignorance. As a matter of fact, she explicitly denies this 
application of her argument in a footnote by stating that ‘prescribing 
social policy and policy for the professions is beyond the scope of 
[the] paper.’4 Let us take a look, therefore, at her own examples of 
situations where individuals can have a duty to know about their ge­
netic condition, and see how she has defended her position in these 
cases.
Professor Rhodes’s examples are the cases of Tom, Dick, Harry and 
Harriette.5 Tom has to decide whether to participate in a population 
study which would provide scientists with a more accurate picture of 
the genetics of Huntington’s disease. Dick has been asked to take part 
in a linkage study to find out what his cousin Martha’s chances are for 
having a child who does not suffer from the Marfan syndrome. Harry, 
who has a strong family history of Huntington’s disease, faces the 
choice of genetic testing, because he is planning on marrying Sally and 
starting a family with her, although he may die young and pass on the 
disease to their children. And Harriette and her husband have decided 
not to find out if they are recessive carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene, 
and to have a child despite the fact that the child’s life can be short 
and full of agony.
Professor Rhodes’s argument to prove that Tom, Dick, Harry and 
Harriette have at least a prima facie moral duty to know about their 
genetic condition seems to proceed in two stages. First, the Kantian
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account of autonomy shows that there cannot be a general right to re­
main in ignorance concerning facts which reasonable individuals 
would, or should, want to know about themselves in order to make 
morally tenable decisions. Secondly, reasonable individuals would, or 
should, want to know about facts which can affect the lives of their 
fellow human beings, especially the lives of their friends and family 
members.
The second step of the argument is defended by an appeal to Aris­
totle’s remarks concerning the obligations of friendship and family 
ties.6 By citing convenient passages of the Nicomachean Ethics, Pro­
fessor Rhodes manages to show that Aristotle indeed asserted that we 
owe something to everybody, and more to our relatives and friends 
than to our fellow citizens and strangers. From this she goes on to 
conclude that Tom has a responsibility to his fellow human beings to 
participate in the population study,7 Dick is obligated by his family 
ties to Martha to provide a blood sample for the linkage study,8 Harry 
has an obligation to pursue genetic knowledge due to his social rela­
tionship with Sally and his undertaking as a future father,9 and Harri- 
ette and her husband have ‘at least a prima facie reason for [thinking] 
that they are ethically obligated to learn crucial genetic facts about 
themselves.’10 These are all, according to Professor Rhodes’s account, 
duties which reasonable people would recognise because of their spe­
cial relationships with other people.
From moral obligations to social duties?
How, then, can these moral duties assigned to individuals be prevented 
from generating social policies and rules of professional conduct,
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which Professor Rhodes wants to exclude from the scope of her arti­
cle, and how firm is the basis of these obligations in ethical theories? 
Unfortunately for the arguments of the article, the answer constitutes a 
dilemma. If the postulated duties are founded on the Aristotelian re­
marks concerning friendship and family ties, then they need not, and 
cannot, be reasonably enforced by legal regulations or professional 
codes. It would presumably be alien to Aristotle’s thinking to insist 
that physicians or public health authorities should direct or coerce us 
into doing good to our family members or friends. But, apart from the 
references to Aristotle’s assertions in the Nicomachean Ethics, Pro­
fessor Rhodes does not offer any arguments for holding this ethical 
view. If, on the other hand, the duty to know is based on the Kantian 
concept of autonomy as presented in the article, and this concept is 
accepted, then the obligations of at least Harry and Harriette can be 
firmly founded. They must know about their genetic constitution in 
order to make fully informed decisions.11 But if this line is taken, it is 
difficult to see how social and professional control could be kept apart 
from the requirement to know. The duty to act autonomously is, after 
all, the cornerstone of Kantian ethics, and banning its enforcement 
would, at least according to Professor Rhodes’s analysis, undermine 
the functioning of the human society.12
There are two significant conclusions that do not follow from these 
remarks. The first is that the critique does not disprove the Aristote­
lian, or any other, notion regarding the relevance of special relation­
ships and knowledge about ourselves in ethics. There may be good 
grounds for thinking that Aristotle’s ideas concerning the primacy of 
family members and friends are correct. And perhaps Kant’s demands 
can be restricted to the sphere of individual morality by employing the
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concept of imperfect duties, or by showing that, in his system, social 
regulations and professional guidelines can legitimately condone mor­
ally reprehensible policies. But none of these defences has been ar­
ticulated in the article.
The second conclusion that does not follow from the foregoing re­
marks is the rejection of all duties in the cases of Tom, Dick, Harry 
and Harriette. The Millian notion of autonomy reconstructed at the 
outset of this note, for instance, can be combined with a consequen- 
tialist morality which bans the infliction of unnecessary and avoidable 
harm on innocent third parties, and which assigns many duties to our 
four protagonists and their relatives and associates. Case by case, the 
most important of these duties are the following.
Obligations based on consequences
Since Tom is indirectly harming other people by not participating in 
the population study, he should reverse his decision in order to be fully 
moral. However, as the accumulation of scientific data does not in any 
way require that he himself be informed, he is allowed to remain in ig­
norance. Dick, on the other hand, harms nobody and has therefore no 
duty to expose himself to the harm that he foresees in acquiring the 
information. Subsequently, the question of violating his right not to 
know does not even arise. In this case, the duties can be assigned, in­
stead, to Martha, who should either pursue the knowledge in other 
ways,13 or simply contain her urge to reproduce altogether.
The case of Harry generates, in the consequentialist framework, an 
array of obligations, including a conditional duty for himself to find
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out about the constitution of his genes. Sally, in her turn, has a pru­
dential obligation to reconsider her attachment to a man who is willing 
to impose risks on their potential offspring. Furthermore, Harry him­
self has an obligation to provide for the needs of the possible children 
in case of his early demise, and, failing that, he has either a duty to re­
frain from having offspring, or to have himself tested.
Finally, Harriette and her husband have the strictest duty not to 
bring into existence a child whose life would probably be short and 
full of suffering. But even they have the moral right to remain in igno­
rance, provided that they decide not to reproduce, after all.
Within the consequentialist view, however, all the duties introduced 
in the last few passages are moral duties to individuals, not social ob­
ligations which could be enforced by law or social policy. The deci­
sions facing lawmakers and public health authorities are different 
from the ones facing individuals. Harm can also be inflicted on citi­
zens and families by legal restrictions, and therefore consequentialist 
analyses do not always require us to transform moral norms into legal 
regulations. Medical professionals can, however, persuade people into 
doing the morally right thing, as long as the ultimate decision-making 
powers remain with the individuals, especially in matters which con­
cern only themselves. Incidentally, this means that physicians do not, 
in theory, have any strict moral duties not to give directive advice to 
their patients or clients, as long as the advice given is intended to 
prompt individuals into right action. But it seems, alas, that non­
directiveness is a good practical guideline, as even philosophers dis­
agree on the rightness and wrongness of many actions -  as evidenced 




In conclusion, Professor Rhodes has not been able to prove that the 
only, or the best, way to tackle the issue of genetic knowledge would 
be through the Kantian concept of autonomy and the Aristotelian no­
tion of friendship. Her attempt to provide this proof is laudable, and 
merits, without doubt, further study. But until proven wrong, one can 
continue to rely on other ways of thinking, and believe that individuals 
do have a prima facie right to remain in ignorance concerning their 
genetic constitution.
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10. How to Apply Ethical Principles to the 
Biotechnological Production of Food - 
The Case of Bovine Growth Hormone*
Ben Mepham has proposed that a ‘matrix’ be used in the analysis of 
ethical problems in food production and elsewhere. In particular cases, this 
matrix would ideally cross the most important moral principles involved, 
and the individuals and groups affected by the decisions. In the following, 
Mepham’s model is assessed in the case of genetically engineered bovine 
growth hormone. My argument is that a more straightforwardly ‘conse- 
quentialist’ analysis can draw attention to the problems of using the hor­
mone better than Mepham’s original proposal. It is possible, however, that 
some nuances will be lost in the process. I do not, therefore, argue for the 
overall superiority of my suggestion -  it is merely a slightly different, and 
perhaps sometimes a more promising, way to analyse the ethical dimen­
sions of food production and marketing.
Introduction
Bovine growth hormone, also known as bovine somatotrophin, or BST, 
has been used since the 1930s to increase the milk yields of cows, and the 
hormone, which was identified as the cause of the improvement in the 
1950s, is now being produced by recombinant DNA-techniques. Cows are 
injected with the genetically engineered hormone (rBST) once every four­
teen or twenty-eight days, and their milk production is increased, on the 
average, by fifteen to twenty-five per cent.1 The companies who manufac­
ture the recombinant hormone are expected to benefit enormously by 
marketing the product, given that they are allowed to do so freely, and the 
dairy farmers who subject their cows to the treatment can also expect a
moderate raise in their incomes.
An analysis of the use of rBST: Mepham’s Matrix
The use of rBST has, however, been opposed for several reasons, most of 
which can be classified as ethical rather than economical or political. 
These reasons have been well presented by Ben Mepham in his recent 
book Food Ethics,2 where he employs a modified version of the principlist 
approach to bioethics, introduced by Tom Beauchamp and James Chil­
dress in their Principles o f  Biomedical Ethics.3 Mepham presents a matrix 
for ethical analyses by applying the principles of well-being, autonomy 
and justice to four groups of beings or entities who can be seen as morally 
significant in assessments of biotechnological food production, namely the 
treated organisms, producers, consumers and the biota, or the animal and 
plant life of a region. The results of his analysis concerning rBST have 
been summarized in Table 1.
The main problems that Mepham sees in the use of rBST are its influ­
ence on the well-being of the dairy cows, the unfair treatment of the pro­
ducers who do not want to adopt the rBST method of dairy farming, and 
the ill-effects of rBST milk on the general public. The treated cows are at 
increased risk of a number of side effects, many of which have painful 
symptoms, including
increased cystic ovaries and disorders of the uterus; higher incidence 
of retained placenta; increased risk of clinical and subclinical mastitis; 
increased digestive disorders such as indigestion, bloat and diarrhoea; 
increased numbers of enlarged hocks and lesions of the knee; disor­
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In addition, the behavioural freedom of the animals is infringed by lame­
ness caused by diseases, and their freedom of movement is almost totally 
blocked by the requirements of energy-dense feeding. Yet another concern 
for Mepham is that the natural functioning of the treated cows, or life 
according to their natural telos, is rendered impossible by the administra-
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tion of rBST.
As regards the producers of milk, Mepham points out that while those 
dairy farmers who adopt the method will probably gain economically, the 
losses of those who are not prepared to use rBST will be considerably 
greater. It follows from this that the non-adopters will be economically 
coerced into changing their fanning methods, and that they will also be 
unjustly punished for their decision not to subject animals to needless 
suffering and their fellow human beings to unnecessary anxieties and 
health hazards.
The physical dangers imposed on the consumers by rBST milk are partly 
due to compositional changes in the product. As Mepham notes:
The galatopoietic effect of BST is associated with an increase in the 
concentration in milk of insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF1), a sub­
stance which is biologically active in humans. Concerns have been ex­
pressed that at the concentrations IGF1 attains in BST milk, and be­
cause it is protected from digestion by the milk protein, casein, it 
might have inappropriate effects on the cells of consumer’s intestinal 
tract.5
Another set of health-related risks brought to the fore by Mepham are the 
public health implications of reduced milk consumption. It has been esti­
mated that the use of milk products would decrease by 11% in the Euro­
pean Community by the introduction of rBST, because many people would 
favour a total boycott of food associated with the substance. Yet milk is 
an essential source of calcium, proteins and vitamins, and further reduc­
tions in its use could trigger, for instance, an epidemic of osteoporosis in 
postmenopausal women especially in the United Kingdom.
Mepham also points out that the ill-effects of rBST extend beyond
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physical harm. Opinion polls indicate that the majority of people are 
seriously concerned about the use of genetic engineering in milk produc­
tion, which means that permitting the practice may cause wide-spread 
distress in those who do not want to abandon milk-associated nutrients 
altogether. Besides, if rBST-treated products are not labelled, which is the 
case in the United States where the use of the hormone is allowed, the 
freedom of choice of consumers is seriously curtailed.
Appeals to environmental damage cannot, as Mepham observes, be 
employed either for or against the use of bovine growth hormone. In­
creased milk production per cow means fewer cows, and this equals less 
methane gas which is a greenhouse gas -  a cause of global warming. On 
the other hand, however, the use of rBST requires intensified farming, 
which in its turn pollutes local environments and is highly dependent of 
fossil fuels, artificial fertilizers, machinery and transportation.
Despite the risks of rBST use, Mepham does not want to draw any 
normative conclusions based on the ethical matrix he has presented. He 
does note that the political decision-makers who decide about the fate of 
rBST use in Europe in the near future should pay attention to the ethical 
considerations revealed by the model. (rBST has been temporarily banned 
in Europe, but this ban, or moratorium, can be revoked.) But Mepham 
stresses the descriptive nature of his matrix, and offers i t 6 as a framework 
for encouraging wider public participation in policy-making’ rather than 
as a prescriptive tool.6
An alternative analysis: the consequences of using rBST
The open-endedness of Mepham’s conclusions can be attributed to many 
factors, among them a healthy suspicion regarding the normative scope, 
or motivational power, of conceptual analyses. Another factor is, however,
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the way in which Mepham classifies the arguments for and against the use 
of rBST in dairy farming. His matrix in the analysis of the rBST case 
contains only three ethical principles, as opposed to the four moral norms 
introduced by Beauchamp and Childress in their pioneering work. He has 
grouped together their principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
under the heading of ‘well-being’, which is fine if the aim is merely to 
describe the pros and cons of human choices, but which can, I believe, 
confuse the issue if more prescriptive results are sought for. If the harm 
inflicted on rBST cows and the consumers of their milk is lumped together 
with economic gains in a crude calculation of utilities and disutilities, it is 
easier to conclude that decisions either for or against the use of the hor­
mone are impossible to reach on the basis of ethical analyses, and that 
democratic procedures are the only acceptable method for weighing the 
different values enhanced and undermined by the practice. But the situa­
tion is, arguably, altered if the harms and benefits are evaluated separately, 
as originally proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, especially if the 
avoidance of harm is seen as the most important consideration.7
The ethical implications of the use of bovine growth hormone in dairy 
farming have been presented in Table 2 in a form which takes into account 
the division between harms and benefits.
My normative starting point for assessing the considerations summa­
rized in Table 2 is that avoidable harm ought not to be caused, unless 
considerably greater harms can thereby be prevented or alleviated. Loss of 
autonomy which can be equalled with physical or psychological damage 
can, according to my reading, also be regarded as harm, although it is 
presented in a separate column. More symbolic violations of autonomy 
and justice are ethically significant only insofar as practices cannot be 
judged by appeals to the harm inflicted by them, directly or indirectly. The
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main results of the revised ethical matrix are the following.











































































As long as dairy cows can be expected to suffer from the use of rBST, 
and consumers are subjected to health hazards by unlabelled rBST milk 
products, the use of the bovine growth hormone is harmful, and should 
therefore be banned. This means that the policy prevailing in the United 
States is unethical, and should be altered forthwith. It also means that the 
moratorium in the European Community regarding the use of rBST should 
be continued. The situation in Europe can be slightly better, if the produc­
ers of treated milk are required to label their merchandise, as recom­
mended by the European Commission Group of Advisers in 1993,8 but the 
increased suffering of the cows would still provide a strong reason against 
the practice.
On the other hand, however, the revised matrix also shows that i f  rBST 
could be administered to cows without causing painful side effects, and i f  
treated milk would be labelled, there would probably not be sufficient 
grounds for prohibiting the use of the hormone. Both consumers and 
producers could choose to be involved with the recombinant hormone or 
to avoid it, and the economic losses and health problems possibly related 
with the use of the treated substances could be avoided by those who want 
to avoid them. The economic restrictions on their freedom of choice would 
still exist, but since safer products are often more expensive than others, 
this does not justify legal prohibitions.
A possible counterargument to my analysis is that by ignoring issues of 
justice and autonomy I have reduced Mepham’s original model to a mere 
utilitarian calculus, thereby compromising its status as a matrix which 
should facilitate ethical decision-making regardless of one’s moral views.9 
In a sense, this is perfectly true. I have tried to show how a person of a 
consequentialist persuasion would like to interpret Mepham’s ideas, and 
this inevitably leads to the mitigation of factors like ‘respect for the telos
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of cows’. From my point of view, if cows suffer, that is bad. If they do not 
suffer from the violation of their ‘intrinsic nature’, then I cannot see what 
the problem is.
But it must be kept in mind that, according to the evidence available to 
us now, dairy animals do suffer from the administration of rBST, and I 
believe that this fact becomes more visible, if the harms and benefits of the 
chosen policies are presented separately. And regardless of people’s par­
ticular moral views, I hope that the suffering of the cows is at least a factor 
among others when decisions concerning the use of rBST are made. For 
those of us who think that the consequences of our actions on the subjec­
tive well-being of sentient beings is paramount, this factor strongly sug­
gests that the use of bovine growth hormone to increase the milk yields of 
cows should not be condoned.
Notes
This paper was prepared for and presented in the First European Conference on 
Agricultural and Food Ethics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, 4-6 March 1999.
It was originally published in the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics 12 (2000): 177-184.
1 The facts of the rBST case have been presented, for instance, in S. Nottingham, 
Eat Your Genes: How genetically modified food is entering our diet (London 
and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1998).
2 He has used the same framework for GM maize in B. Mepham, ‘A framework 
for the ethical analysis of novel foods: The ethical matrix’, Journal of Agricul-
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tural and Environmental Ethics 12 (2000): 165-176.
3 T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th edn 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
4 Mepham borrows this list from the 1993 package insert of Posilac, one of the 
rBST products on the market (manufactured by the Monsanto Company) -  B. 
Mepham, ‘Ethical analysis of food biotechnologies: an evaluative framework’, in 
B. Mepham ( e d Food Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 101- 
119, 108-109.
5 Mepham (1996,110) refers here to T.B. Mepham, P.N. Schofield, W. Zumkel- 
ler and A.M. Cotterill, ‘Safety of milk from cows treated with bovine somato- 
trophin’, Lancet 344 (1995): 1445-1446; and C.J. Xian, C.A. Shoubridge and 
L.C. Read, ‘Degradation of insulin-like growth factor-1 in the adult rat gastroin­
testinal tract is limited by a specific antiserum of the dietary protein casein’, 
Journal o f Endodocrinology 146 (1995): 215-225.
6 The cited passage is from Mepham 1996, 117. He makes the same point in 
slightly different terms on page 112, and in Mepham 2000.
71 have sketched an alternative reading of the four principles, based on the idea 
of the supremacy of avoiding harm, in M. Häyry, ‘Ethics committees, principles 
and consequences’, Jo umal o f Medical Ethics 24 (1998): 81-85.
8 European Commission Group of Advisers on the Ethical Aspects of Biotechnol­
ogy, The Ethical Implications o f the Use of Performance-enhancers in Agri­
culture and Fisheries (Rapporteurs M. WamockandM. Sinisalo), 1993.
91 owe this point to Dr Mepham.
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Appendix
My Way to Bioethics
A Story of Otherness and Chance Encounters’
I was first introduced to the combination of philosophy and medicine 
in December 1983. Heta Gylling, my wife at the time, and I had at­
tended mind-boggling lectures on ‘Being’, ‘Time’ and ‘Differance’ at 
the University of Helsinki during the Fall term, and wanted desper­
ately to get our hands on something more concrete. She read Peter 
Singer’s Practical Ethics [1] and I wrote a seminar paper on Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s ‘A defence of abortion’ [2] -  which was suggested 
to me by our supervisor, Timo Airaksinen.
Thomson’s essay was difficult to understand, but Singer’s pro­
vocative and clearly stated views on abortion, euthanasia and other 
life-and-death matters were an instant hit. Our Master’s dissertations 
in practical philosophy dealt with abortion and euthanasia, and set us 
both on a definite course toward bioethics.
For the following decade or so Heta and I worked closely together, 
which means that many events recorded here belong to her history as 
well as mine. But I have tried to focus on those aspects of the events 
which made them a part of my personal, and still ongoing, quest to 
find my way to bioethics -  or out of it, as the case may be.
The primal encounters
When I look back to the years between the completion of my disser­
tation on abortion in October 1984 and the present time, April 2000,1 
am forced to realise that my research topics have been more or less
dictated by chance meetings with philosophers, bioethicists, and 
other people in general. I can make out six episodes which have sig­
nificantly shaped my quest.
The first episode involves an encounter with journalists and the 
general public in Finland. In 1986 Heta and I published our Master’s 
dissertations as a book [3], which caught some media attention for a 
while. In addition to transforming us into unbearable know-it-alls, the 
transitory fame led at least me to believe that people are truly inter­
ested in rational arguments, and that philosophers can make a real 
difference by analysing policies and attitudes which underlie medical 
decisions. For two or three years I worked on the problems of abor­
tion, euthanasia, AIDS and reproductive medicine under the illusion 
that everything I write will be read and celebrated by wide interna­
tional as well as national audiences. It took the blunt rejection of a 
particularly hubristic paper on AIDS, and the monumental commer­
cial flopping of an edited book on new reproductive technologies [4] 
for me to grasp that popularity and philosophical integrity are two 
different things.
The second episode started with an encounter with Sakari Kar­
jalainen -  then a young medical doctor who worked as a research 
fellow at the Finnish Cancer Registry. His own research interest was 
epidemiological, and collaboration with him produced during 1988- 
89 a series of rather decent studies on AIDS, smoking policy, vacci­
nations, and justice in health care allocation [5-10]. This was a clear 
shift towards the ethics of social medicine from the more individual­
istic realms of abortion and euthanasia. Among other things, it pro­
vided the sidelight necessary for the completion of some previously 
drafted articles on the beginning and the end of life [11-15].
During a creative interlude from bioethical research -  I think I was
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completing a dissertation on neo-idealistic aesthetics for a degree in 
theoretical philosophy -  four more people came into the picture, and 
changed it significantly over time. These were Ruth Chadwick, John 
Harris, Soren Holm and Peter Singer, first met in philosophical and 
bioethical conferences in England and in Scotland. The meeting with 
Peter Singer was particularly educational. He was at the time under 
heavy attack in Germany, where his lectures had been violently inter­
rupted and people with whom he collaborated had been academically 
persecuted [16]. Quite apart from the fact that Peter is one of the 
kindest persons I have ever met, the unfairness and irrationality of the 
movement against him was so obvious that I have still not, although a 
decade has passed, been able to wholly restore my faith in the Ger­
man mentality in bioethical matters.
Drifting towards theory
The third episode involves a short but consequential encounter with 
Matti Hakama, whom I met through Sakari. He encouraged me to 
explore the ins and outs of quality-of-life measurements in medicine 
and health care [17], and directed my interest to the methodological 
dimensions of bioethical work. At the same time, in early 1990, Timo 
Airaksinen began prompting me to finish my doctoral thesis, which I 
did by lumping together ten articles under one cover and writing an 
introduction where I defined the method I felt was best suited to the 
philosophical study of issues in medical and health care ethics [18]. 
As one of my internal examiners, Heikki Kannisto, noted, there was 
the slight embarrassment that the chapters of the thesis did not in any 
way follow the method set out in the introduction. That did not pre­
vent Timo and my external examiner, John Harris, from accepting the 
work. Their comments, over dinner right after the public defence of
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the thesis, determined, however, the shape of the fourth episode of 
my journey.
Timo and John argued that the method I proposed for bioethical 
work was utterly relativistic. I was rather taken aback by their re­
marks, because I believed that my model set a firm foundation for 
ethical judgements, based on the consequences of human actions, 
interpreted through logic and, in difficult cases, through moral emo­
tions shared in the communities where the judgements are made. 
True, I rejected the possibility of an absolute, universal, all- 
encompassing theory which would tell every human being in every 
situation at all times and all over the world what they must or must 
not do. But I thought this rejection was self-evident in medical ethics. 
One only has to think about matters like abortion and euthanasia -  
nobody has come up with solutions which would be even remotely 
acceptable to all others.
Anyway, being the impressionable fool that I am, I tried for the 
following three years to escape from medical ethics, and attempted to 
create a theory which would show everybody how applied ethics 
should be done and on what theoretical basis. The literary result was 
a book on utilitarianism which John promptly published in 1994 in a 
series he edited [19], and a bunch of articles which expand on its 
themes [20-25]. Normatively, however, this project left me exactly 
where I had been. It made it no clearer to me how anybody can be­
lieve that there is one ethical model which universally solves all 
moral problems.
During my adventures in the never-never-land of universal moral 
theory Peter Singer reappeared in another context. At some point 
Heta and I had become involved in animal welfare issues, and in Fall 
1992 Peter visited Helsinki and gave a series of academic and public
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lectures. I mention this because one meeting with Peter changed my 
diet in a way which has become also philosophically important to me. 
On one October evening Peter, Heta, Timo and I had dinner in an In­
dian restaurant where Peter had a vegetarian meal while the rest of us 
had portions of chicken, pork and beef. The author of Animal Lib­
eration [26] did not comment in any way our choices, but his mere 
presence stirred something up in Heta and me. When we went home 
that night, we threw, after a brief negotiation, away all food products 
which contained pork. The reason was, vaguely, that pigs are the 
cleverest animals people usually eat, and should be left alone. But 
whatever the reasons, I for one have not knowingly eaten pork since 
that day. And every time I come upon somebody who holds immuta­
ble moral convictions which I find alien I think about the times when 
I have had to explain to hostesses and hosts who have made an effort 
to serve a delicious dinner that something in their cooking does not 
agree with my self-chosen dietary principles. In other words, I can 
now understand categorical arguments in bioethical discussions, even 
if I do not accept them myself.
Projects -  the cages with golden bars
In 1993 I was dragged back to bioethics -  which I had, I must admit, 
hardly left -  by John Harris whose international project on AIDS and 
justice drew together academics from many European countries. This 
fifth episode of my academic journey was regulated by meetings of 
the group and by the topics we were supposed to cover. At the outset 
John expressed his concern that some of us might have already 
‘written ourselves out’ of the AIDS issue by previous research and 
publications. This turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy at least 
in my case.
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I started by preparing a paper on the role of philosophers in 
bioethical research programmes [27]. My main point was that while 
others can be assigned duties to collect data and provide facts, phi­
losophers should be left in peace to prepare their snide conceptual 
remarks on the work done by others. Understandably, these views did 
not gain much popularity in a group which consisted mainly of medi­
cal professionals, lawyers and people involved in psychology and so­
cial work. I also wrote on people’s reactions to their own impending 
illness and death [28], and argued, among other things, that devoted 
Christians and Jews should not be overtly resentful when they are 
confronted with a fatal disease. Simple logic dictates that faith in the 
ultimate wisdom of God’s decisions should check their bitterness. 
This modest theological insight was not greeted with enthusiasm in 
the conventionally religious audience.
Finally, as a reaction to what had been said in earlier meetings, I 
presented a paper entitled Ts it intolerable that children are bom in­
fected with HIV?’ [29]. Members of the group had asserted that it is 
intolerable, or at least strongly undesirable, that newborns are con­
genitally infected. But they had also stated that pregnant women who 
are HTV positive should be counselled into having their babies. Oth­
ers had noted that people have an internationally recognised human 
right to reproductive freedom. But they had also said that needless 
suffering should be avoided. Amidst all this, my argument was that if 
it is a bad thing that babies suffer, then people who intend to bring 
into this world a baby who would probably suffer can be met with 
moral pressure not to conceive. In practical terms, this means that 
people should be allowed to say to each other: ‘Don’t have a child if 
there’s a good chance that it will suffer horribly and die young! If 
you do, I’ll think that you are immoral.’ Somehow this made me a
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monster in the eyes of most members of the group.
While I was hitting this all-time low in my academic popularity and 
self-esteem, one person in the project group, Soren Holm, helped me, 
perhaps unwittingly, to redirect my activities once again towards 
ethical theory. Our discussions on the philosophical aspects of the 
group’s work and, above all, Soren’s tolerance and wide leamed- 
ness, convinced me that knowledge of the tradition preceding us is 
essential to the understanding of our contemporary concerns. Be­
sides, no argument sounds quite so suspicious if you can put it into 
the mouth of a respected philosopher of the past. I resolved to clarify 
to myself the history of Western moral and political philosophy.
The sixth episode of my quest had been prefaced already in 1991 
by John Harris, who had, following the defence of my doctoral thesis, 
invited Heta and me to Manchester to take part in a conference on the 
ethics of genetic engineering. The publication of the proceedings in 
1994 [30], with Heta’s paper and mine [31], apparently convinced 
Ruth Chadwick that we might know something about the ethics of 
genetics. In any case, during the next four years my bioethical re­
search topics were defined to a large extent by the needs of Ruth’s 
two European projects, one on the attitudes of young people to bio­
technology, and the other on the moral and legal aspects of genetic 
screening and testing [32-33]. This time, the structure given by the 
projects was all right by me, partly because the issue was relatively 
new, and partly because I had seized a temporary teaching job which 
allowed me to explore the depths of moral theory in the best way I 
know -  by infesting my views on unsuspecting young minds. I pre­
pared a series of studies on the ethics of biotechnology [34-38], 
taught introductory courses of philosophy, and landed in 1997 fund­
ing for a project, and a research position for myself, at the Academy
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of Finland. Combining my two interests, I entitled the project for my 
research fellowship ‘European moral philosophy and the possibility 
of consensus, especially regarding legislation on gene technology’.
In a way, my present philosophical and bioethical existence is a 
continuum to the genetics and moral theory episode. During the last 
two years, I have been appointed to yet another temporary teaching 
position in philosophy, completed book manuscripts on the history of 
moral and political philosophy [39-40], and continued turning out 
papers on the ethics of genetics [41-46]. The most tangible change in 
my life is personal, but it has also influenced my academic activities. 
I now work with Tuija Takala, my wife since 1999, and a community 
of people with whom it is increasingly pleasurable to explore the in­
tricacies of human morality. These people include Sakari Karjalainen 
and others in Helsinki, some old friends in Turku, Simo Vehmas in 
Jyväskylä, and Rosamond Rhodes in New York. Appropriately for 
my story, the last paper I wrote before starting these memoirs was on 
Rosamond and Simo’s conflicting views on abortion -  on my very 
first topic in bioethics sixteen years ago [47-49].
Logic and emotions
The abortion issue continues to be, for me, one the best laboratories 
to clarify the relationship between ethical theory and moral practice. 
When I first started to write on abortion, my implicit aim was to find 
a justification for the ‘moderate’ policies which prevailed in Finland. 
In other words, I felt, like most people seem to do, that abortions are 
in some cases wrong and in other cases acceptable. But the more I 
studied the philosophical arguments, the clearer it became to me that 
only the extreme positions have any real coherence, or cogency. The 
official Catholic view in all its restrictive absurdity is a beautiful con-
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struction, and the entirely permissive view is impervious to theoreti­
cal criticism, if its basic tenets are assumed. Moderate views, on the 
other hand, were at least in the mid-eighties clumsy edifices dictated 
more by practice than by theory, which did not stand up to the tests 
of logical consistency or conceptual coherence. The intermediary 
conclusion I drew from this was that on purely philosophical grounds 
the choice must be made between the restrictive and permissive 
views. This means, among other things, that I had to change my mind 
about the legitimacy of the prevailing abortion policy.
The next question, however, is, ‘How should the choice between 
two internally consistent but mutually contradictory policies be 
made?’ And my response to this was to resort to shared moral emo­
tions and intuitions. Policies which generate, in real or imaginary 
situations, prohibitions and permissions, which are seen as repulsive 
or unfair within a certain community, can be rejected, in that com­
munity, as counterintuitive. When it comes to abortion in the affluent 
West, for instance, the fully restrictive view can be ruled out by ap­
peals to rape, incest, and contraceptive failures. Like Thomson ar­
gued in her essay [2], the majority of people in the United States and 
Europe would consider it unfair if abortions were prohibited in some 
of these cases. And this provides some indirect support to the fully 
permissive view as the only logically and emotionally acceptable 
solution.
There are two ways of using emotions as the basis of moral judge­
ments. The first is to state, like Patrick Devlin stated in his lecture 
‘The enforcement of morals’ [50], that practices like homosexuality, 
abortion and cruelty to animals should be banned because they arouse 
feelings of intolerance, indignation and disgust in ordinary people. 
This strategy is both theoretically and practically problematic [46],
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which is why I have never employed it. The second way, my way, is 
to use emotions only in order to falsify ethical views which pretend 
to be universal [18,19,27]. If someone asserts that abortions should 
always be forbidden, the assertion can be repudiated by finding or 
creating one case where the prohibition would clearly be unreason­
able, unfair, or otherwise emotionally unacceptable.
The same model can, of course, be applied to attack the entirely 
permissive view on abortion. When somebody says, like I do, that 
abortions should never be forbidden, those who disagree are free to 
seek cases in which the license to abort would be unreasonable. The 
proponents of restrictions normally seem to think that third-trimester 
terminations of pregnancies which are going well both for the 
‘mother’ and the ‘child’ are a case in point [47,48]. I think I agree 
with them morally, but disagree legally.
By the last remark I mean that ideally the law should not interfere 
with actions which do not physically or mentally harm others. And 
since there is no ‘other’ in the abortion case, the law should not dic­
tate what the woman should or should not do. If people want to argue 
about the morality of late terminations without coercing women into 
having children, they can, of course, do so. In these arguments they 
are allowed to use elements which would be illegitimate in legal 
analyses -  appeals to virtues, ethical duties, reasonable expectations, 
shared moral beliefs and the like. But these moral considerations 
must not be smuggled back to discussions concerning the law.
Otherness
My career in bioethics, such as it is, has been marked throughout by a 
sense of ‘otherness’, or dissidence. I am a philosopher first, and find 
it difficult to be a part of a multidisciplinary community which pre-
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tends to have positive answers to practical questions in medicine and 
health care provision. I do not believe that philosophers can, or 
should, become hospital bioethicists, legislators, politicians or ad­
ministrators. I believe, instead, that philosophers are at their best in 
the role of ‘barking dogs’ -  as critics of intellectually lame attempts 
to justify, after the fact, practices and policies which may be eco­
nomically or politically necessary but which are not based on reason, 
or even on shared moral intuitions. This is not a popular message in 
an age which wants to domesticate philosophers into explaining why 
the already chosen policies must be accepted.
My otherness also extends to the realm of ethical theory. I do not 
believe, like some of my colleagues do [47,48], that Aristotle or Kant 
could provide us with the right answers to all bioethical questions. 
Nor do I believe, although I have sometimes sounded like I did 
[44,52], that consequentialist thinking would fare much better. I have 
my doubts concerning the mixed approaches which are exemplified 
by the American ‘principlism’ of Tom Beauchamp and James Chil­
dress [53]. And I do not think that philosophical answers to practical 
questions could be found in psychoanalysis, sociology, history, or lit­
erature, like some European ethicists seem to think.
I suppose I could still become a proper bioethicist -  a teacher of 
medical ethics, an administrator, a legislator or a politician. Given the 
choice, however, I would rather not. Other people are better trained, 
and more disposed, to occupy those positions. I like my role as a 
philosopher who knows something about the ethics of medicine but is 
not required to know it all, or worse, to pretend to know it all.
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Cast (in order of appearance)
H eta Gylling continues to teach philosophy at the University of Helsinki, 
and to participate in international bioethical activities.
Timo Airaksinen still holds the position of Professor of Practical Philoso­
phy at the University of Helsinki. His research interests do not include 
bioethics.
Sakari Karjalainen completed his doctorate in epidemiology in 1991. He 
works currently as the Secretary General of the Research Council for Health 
at the Academy of Finland, and participates actively in bioethical discus­
sions in many European committees and working groups.
Ruth Chadwick is Professor of Moral Philosophy and Head of the Centre 
for Professional Ethics at the University of Central Lancashire. She estab­
lished during the 1990s her position at the very top of international 
bioethics.
John Harris is Professor of Bioethics at the University of Manchester and 
heads the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy there. His international repu­
tation, which was initially gained already in the 1970s and the 1980s, lias 
only grown stronger.
Seren Holm moved recently from his native Copenhagen to Manchester, 
where he awaits his imminent Professorship in bioethics and the philosophy 
of medicine. In addition to his present Readership in Manchester, he is a 
part-time Professor of Medical Ethics in Oslo.
Peter Singer just left his native Australia to become a Professor of Philoso­
phy at Princeton. His arrival was greeted with loud objections by the 
spokespersons of organisations for handicapped people, who probably have 
a very vague idea regarding the content of his work.
M atti Hakama is Professor of Epidemiology at the Tampere University 
School of Public Health, and participates in bioethical decision-making as a 
member of the Research Council for Health at the Academy of Finland. 
Heikki Kannisto continues, after a brief episode in practical philosophy, to 
teach theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki and other Finnish
1 5 4
universities.
Tuija Takala is currently finalising her doctoral thesis on the ethics of 
modem biotechnologies at the University of Turku.
Old friends in Turku include Professor Juhani Pietarinen, Doctor Juha 
Räikkä and Mr Veikko Launis.
Simo Vehmas works as a Research Associate at the Jyväskylä University 
Department of Special Education. He is preparing a doctoral thesis on the 
moral (irrelevance of intellectual disabilities.
Rosamond Rhodes, although slightly exploited by her current employers at 
Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, where she is Professor of Philosophy and 
Director of the Bioethics Programme, is rapidly becoming one of the best 
Kantian bioethicists in the world.
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